Kansas Supreme Court
DATE OF INJURY—WORKERS COMPENSATION
KNOLL V. OLATHE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 233
WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD OF APPEALS—REVERSED and REMANDED
COURT OF APPEALS—AFFIRMED
NO. 116,167—APRIL 19, 2019
FACTS: Knoll filed a claim for workers compensation coverage and requested a hearing. The claim did not proceed to final hearing within three years, so the school district moved for dismissal. The ALJ denied that request, holding that under K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 44-523(f) Knoll had five years to either proceed to final hearing or request an extension of time. The Board affirmed that holding but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1) controlled Knoll's claim and required either a final hearing or a motion within three years. Knoll's petition for review was granted.
ISSUE: (1) Which version of K.S.A. 44-523 controlled Knoll's claim
HELD: The only issue is which version of the statute controls—the 2009 version, which allows five years, or the 2011 version, which allows three years. The beginning point for applicable law in a workers compensation case is the date of injury. For Knoll, that was in 2009. But when a law changes, the amendments apply to the worker if the changes are procedural in nature. Statutes of limitation are considered procedural, and the 2011 amendments to K.S.A. 44-523 were very similar to a statute of limitation. And the changes went into effect before Knoll filed her application for hearing. K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1) applies to any cases that were pending during its enactment where the claimant did not file an application for hearing until after the 2011 amendments took effect.
DISSENT: (Rosen, J.) The 2011 changes to K.S.A. 44-523 do not create a three-year time limit. While the 2011 statute was the correct one to apply to Knoll's claim, it does not bar the ALJ from considering Knoll's request for an extension of time.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1); K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 44-523(f)
ELECTRONIC FILING—MOTIONS TO DISMISS
LAMBERT V. PETERSON
WYANDOTTE DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 117,344—APRIL 19, 2019
FACTS: Lambert filed a medical malpractice action as the administrator of the estate of Stan Novak. All defendants filed motions to dismiss on grounds that Lambert's petition was barred by the statute of limitations; file stamps on the petition showed it was filed one day after the two-year limitations period expired. Lambert responded by claiming that she electronically filed the petition within the statute of limitations but it was rejected by the clerk's office. Once she learned of the rejection she made the required changes and uploaded the petition for a second time, although it was outside of the statute of limitations. Lambert argued that the petition should be deemed filed as of the date of payment. The district court heard the motion, at which Lambert provided no testimony and presented no affidavit or declaration. The district court ruled that it was unable to equitably extend the statute of limitations and dismissed the action. Lambert appealed and the Supreme Court took the case on transfer.
ISSUE: (1) Date of filing
HELD: It is undisputed that the limitations period ran two years following Novak's death, and it is undisputed that the petition was filed one day after that date. Lambert's claim that the petition was actually filed on that date is not supported by any evidence in the record on appeal. Lambert had the opportunity to present evidence, through an affidavit or declaration, but she failed to do so. Lambert also failed to present the actual documents that were transmitted in her first attempt to electronically file the petition. Lambert's failure to present adequate evidence means the district court's ruling must be affirmed.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-212(d), -256, -656(c)(2), -656(e)(2); K.S.A. 60-513(a)(4), -513(a)(5), -513(a)(7)
GLAZE V. J.K. WILLIAMS LLC
WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD—BOARD OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED
BOARD IS AFFIRMED
NO. 115,763—APRIL 19, 2019
FACTS: Glaze claimed that he was injured while working for J.K. Williams, LLC, and he filed a motion for hearing. In 2016, Williams moved to dismiss claiming that Glaze's claim should be dismissed because the claim had been neither heard nor settled within three years of filing the application for hearing. After the motion was filed, Glaze filed a request for extension of time. The ALJ granted Williams' motion to dismiss, finding that K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1) required dismissal because Glaze did not request an extension of time within three years of the filing of his application for hearing. This decision was confirmed by the Workers Compensation Board of Appeals and again by the Court of Appeals. Glaze's petition for review was granted.
ISSUE: (1) Requirements of K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1)
HELD: K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1) unambiguously prohibits an ALJ from granting an extension of time unless the motion for extension has been filed within three years of the filing of the application for hearing.
DISSENT: (Rosen, J.) Justice Rosen would look beyond the majority's grammatical reasoning when considering ambiguity. This statute is susceptible to multiple interpretations and for that reason, he believes the Legislature intended the three-year time limit to apply to a conclusive presumption of good cause.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 44-523(f)(1)
consTitutional law—criminal law—criminal procedurE—evidence—motions—sentences—statutes
state v. boysaw
sedgwick district court—affirmed
court of appeals—affirmed
NO. 112,834—april 19, 2018
FACTS: Boysaw was charged with aggravated indecent liberties with a child. He filed motion in limine to bar evidence of his criminal history or uncharged conduct. Finding probative value of the proffered evidence was not outweighed by prejudicial effect, district court allowed State to introduce evidence of Boysaw’s 1987 Nebraska sexual assault conviction, for purposes of showing both propensity and motive or intent and absence of mistake. Jury convicted Boysaw on the charged offense. Life sentence without parole imposed. Boysaw appealed claiming: (1) State provided insufficient evidence his conduct was intended to arouse or satisfy sexual desires; (2) admission of evidence of the Nebraska conviction violated fair trial guarantees in U.S. and Kansas constitutions; (3) district court erred in weighing probative value of prior conviction evidence against prejudicial effect; and (4) error to use the Nebraska conviction to sentence him as a habitual sex offender. Court of appeals affirmed, 52 Kan. App. 2d 635 (2016). Review granted.
ISSUES: (1) Sufficiency of the evidence; (2) constitutionality of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d); (3) probative value of prior conviction versus prejudicial effect; (4) sentencing
HELD: Evidence of Boysaw’s intent was circumstantial but compelling enough on the record to provide more than sufficient evidence to prove elements of the crime.
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d) does not violate federal constitutional protections. Court outlines law in effect for admission of evidence under K.S.A. 60-455 in State v. Prine, 287 Kan. 713 (2009)(Prine I), the Legislature’s amendment of the statute in response, and rejection of the ex post facto challenge to application of the amended statute in State v. Prine, 297 Kan. 460 (2013)(Prine II). Given the historical use of propensity evidence in Kansas, coupled with safeguard of weighing probative against prejudicial effect of the evidence, the statute does not offend any principle of justice so rooted in traditions and conscience of the people of Kansas that it must be deemed fundamental. State constitutional argument is not decided because Boysaw failed to adequately brief why a different result should follow under state guidelines. Long history of coextensive analysis of rights under the two constitutions is noted for consideration in any future argument on this issue.
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455 and Fed.R.Civ.P. 403 are compared. In Kansas, the weighing of probative value versus prejudicial effect is a judicial construct rather than rule based. Factors to be considered in that weighing are set forth. In this case, district court’s analysis of the admissibility of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d) evidence is approved and upheld.
Boysaw abandoned his claim that the Nebraska conviction did not qualify as a sexually violent crime in Kansas, and his challenge to the constitutionality of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6626 was defeated by controlling caselaw.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5506(b)(3), -6626, 60-455, -455(d); K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 21-5506(b)(3)(A), -5506(c)(3); K.S.A. 2009 Supp. 21-4642; K.S.A. 60-455
state v. murdock
shawnee district court—reversed and remanded
NO. 117,315—april 19, 2019
FACTS: Murdock was convicted of aggravated robbery and robbery. On appeal, Kansas Supreme Court reversed and remanded for resentencing, finding Murdock’s prior out-of-state convictions must be scored as nonperson offenses, and holding the comparable Kansas offense should be determined as of the date the out-of-state offenses were committed. 299 Kan. 312 (2014). At resentencing, district court applied Murdock and scored the out-of-state convictions as nonperson felonies, resulting in a criminal history of C instead of A. Six months later, State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560 (2015), overruled Murdock, holding the comparable Kansas offense is the one in effect at the time the current crime of conviction was committed. State then moved to correct Murdock’s sentence. District court granted the motion and sentenced Murdock a third time, finding a criminal history score of A. Murdock appealed, arguing his second sentence was legally imposed under Murdock, and did not become illegal after Keel changed the law. While his appeal was pending, the legislature amended K.S.A. 22-3504 to state a sentence is not made illegal by a change in the law after the sentence is pronounced. Case transferred to Kansas Supreme Court, which granted supplemental briefing on retroactive application of the amended statute, and on Murdock’s alternative argument based on State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552 (2018).
ISSUE: (1) Legality of sentence
HELD: Under K.S.A. 22-3504, the legality of a sentence is controlled by the law in effect at the time the sentence was pronounced. Therefore, a sentence that was legal when pronounced does not become illegal if the law subsequently changes. K.S.A. does not give either party the benefit of later changes in the law, but does give both parties the opportunity to revisit a merits determination of legality in the limited circumstance when there is reason to think that determination was wrong in the first place. Here Murdock’s second sentence was legally imposed according to the Murdock mandate, and Keel did not render Murdock’s second sentence illegal. Reversed and remanded to reinstate Murdock’s lawful sentence. Applicability of Wetrich and retroactivity of the amendment to K.S.A. 22-3504 is not considered.
CONCURRENCE (Biles, J.): Concurs in the result.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3504, -3504(3); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(2), -6811(e)(3); K.S.A. 21-4711(e), 22-3504, -3504(1)
criminal law—criminal procedure—jury instructions
state v. qualls
shawnee district court—reversed and remanded
NO. 115,648—april 19, 2019
FACTS: Qualls convicted of premeditated first-degree murder. Conviction reversed, based on district court’s failure to give lesser included offenses instructions. 297 Kan. 61 (2013). On retrial, jury again found him guilty of premeditated first-degree murder. Qualls appealed on issues including alleged error in not granting a defense request for a self-defense instruction.
ISSUE: (1) Self-defense instruction
HELD: State v. Haygood, 308 Kan. 1387 (2018), clarified the objective and subjective requirements that must be met to receive a self-defense instruction, and the kind of evidence that suffices to meet those requirements. In the present case, a self-defense instruction was legally appropriate, and under Haygood, Qualls’ testimony was sufficient to make the self-defense instruction factually appropriate. Under facts in this case, denying the requested self-defense instruction was error, and the error was not harmless. Reversed and remanded to district court.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5108(c), -5222
constitutional law—criminal law—criminal procedure—evidence—motions—sentences—statutes
state v. razzaq
sedgwick district court—affirmed; court of appeals—affirmed
NO. 114,325—April 19, 2019
FACTS: Razzaq was convicted of aggravated indecent liberties with a child. Court of appeals affirmed the conviction in an unpublished opinion. Razzaq’s petition for review granted on claims that: (1) district court erred in allowing a State witness to introduce fact of Razzaq’s prior convictions in Missouri for sex crimes, (2) K.S.A. 2918 Supp. 60-455(d) violates Kansas Constitution’s right to fair trial; (3) Court of appeals inadequately addressed the speedy trial issue raised in supplemental briefing; and (4) constitutional error to use prior convictions to enhance sentence.
ISSUES: (1) Probative value of prior convictions versus prejudicial effect; (2) constitutionality of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455(d) under Kansas Constitution; (3) speedy trial; (4) sentencing
HELD: As held in State v. Boysaw (Case No. 112,834, decided this date), safeguards in Kansas courts for admission of evidence of other bad acts resemble Federal Rule of Evidence 403, requiring a district court to weigh probative value of such evidence against the danger of unfair prejudice. In this case, the district court implicitly weighed the probative value of evidence of the Missouri convictions against danger of undue prejudice and did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
No violation of the Kansas Constitution. To the extent Razzaq argues that other states have found state constitutional violations in their bad-acts evidentiary statutes, no similarity to Kansas Constitution is shown.
District court and court of appeals correctly determined that the record does not support Razzaq’s speedy trial claims.
Constitutional challenge to Razzaq’s sentence is defeated by State v. Ivory, 273 Kan. 33 (2002).
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3402(b), 60-455(d); K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 60-455(d); K.S.A. 21-3504(a)(1)
criminal procedure—jurisdiction—motions —post-conviction relief
stAte v. robertson
butler district court—affirmed
NO. 118,427—april 19, 2019
FACTS: Robertson was convicted of first-degree murder, arson, and aggravated burglary. The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences on direct appeal, 279 Kan. 291 (2005), and rejected various post-conviction motions seeking relief under K.S.A. 22-3504 and K.S.A. 60-1507. Robertson then invoked jurisdiction under K.S.A. 22-3504 to file motion to correct illegal sentence and motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. He alleged fatal defect in the charging document because it named him as an individual rather than sovereign, and used an incorrect (non-trust) version of his name. He also reserved rights not to perform under Kansas statutes that he construed as commercial contracts. District court summarily denied relief. Robertson appealed.
ISSUES: (1) Motion to correct illegal sentence; (2) motion to dismiss and K.S.A. 60-1507
HELD: Robertson cannot collaterally attack a conviction through a motion to correct an illegal sentence filed under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3504 that claims a defective complaint meant the district court lacked jurisdiction to convict. Personal jurisdiction distinguished from Robertson’s reliance on subject matter jurisdiction caselaw.
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3504 provides no statutory basis for jurisdiction over Robertson’s motion to dismiss. Even if liberally construed as a motion under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507, the motion would be procedurally barred as successive and filed out of time.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3504, -3504(1), -3504(3), -3601(b)(3), 60-1507, -1507(c), -1507(f)(1), -1504(f)(2); K.S.A. 22-3504, 60-1507
Kansas Court of Appeals
PARENTS AND CHILDREN
IN RE W.L.
CRAWFORD DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 119,536—APRIL 19, 2019
FACTS: M.S. and E.L. were in a same-sex relationship but never married. E.L. conceived two children during the relationship, using artificial insemination. There was never a written agreement regarding parentage and it is undisputed that M.S. is not a biological parent and never adopted the children. There was testimony that M.S. was not very involved during the pregnancy and made few decisions regarding the care of the children. After the couple split, M.S. saw the children regularly but E.L. had concerns over whether M.S. was a fit parent. M.S. filed a parentage action. After a trial, the district court concluded that even if M.S. could establish a presumption of parentage under the Kansas Parentage Act, E.L. rebutted that presumption by proving that M.S. failed to meet the criteria of a functional parent.
ISSUES: (1) Presumption of parentage; (2) rebuttal of presumption; (3) best interests analysis; (4) equal protection
HELD: Under the KPA, an unmarried person seeking to establish a parent-child relationship with a child conceived using artificial reproductive technology must attempt to do so by using the procedure established by the KPA. Although there was no written acknowledgment of parentage in this case, the district court seemed to apply the presumption, to M.S.'s benefit. Although it would have been better to have explicitly done that analysis, any failure by the district court to do so was harmless. The absence of a written agreement makes it difficult to interpret the parties' intent. In the absence of that written agreement, E.L. met her burden to overcome the presumption in favor of M.S. This is especially true because the district court found E.L. to be more credible than M.S., and credibility determinations are not reviewable on appeal. The district court was not required to make a best interests finding, but doing so was not erroneous. M.S. fails to prove that the KPA treats classes of people differently.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 23-2204, -2205, -2208(a), -2208(a)(4), -2208(b), -2220, -2302, -2303, 59-2114, -2115