Kansas Supreme Court
VIA CHRISTI HOSPITALS V. KAN-PAK, LLC
WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD—COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED,
WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD IS AFFIRMED
NO. 116,692—NOVEMBER 1, 2019
FACTS: Darin Pinion was severely burned while working at Kan-Pak. Via Christi provided medical care; his total bills exceeded $1 million. Kan-Pak's workers compensation insurance was provided by Travelers, who contracted with Paradigm to coordinate complicated cases. Paradigm paid only $136,451.60 of Pinion's considerable bill, under the 2011 Schedule of Medical Fees. For the 2011 Maximum Fee Schedule, language was added which allowed insurers to pay the lesser of the 70 percent stop loss calculation or the MS-DRG formula. It is unknown how the "lesser of" language ended up in the statute, as no one from the agency claimed knowledge of the addition. Via Christi requested reimbursement of 70% of Pinion's total bill. An ALJ found that the language in the regulation controlled and that it was without authority to ignore the "lesser of" language. The Board agreed and Via Christi appealed. The Court of Appeals reasoned that if no one at the agency knew that the "lesser of" language was added, that change was not properly promulgated and was ineffective. The Court of Appeals was unwilling to enforce an accidental rule, believing the outcome would be arbitrary and capricious. Paradigm's petition for review was granted.
ISSUES: (1) Jurisdiction, (2) effectiveness of the 2011 regulation
HELD: Jurisdiction exists to hear the merits of the case. The director of workers compensation is ultimately responsible for preparing the fee schedule. He is not a party to this action and the faulty rulemaking was not raised as a cause of action. The issue of rulemaking by the director—accidental or otherwise—was never properly before the Board on appeal from the hearing officer. These proceedings were initiated as a fee dispute under a narrowly-drawn statute. It was not arbitrary or capricious to follow a plainly-worded regulation and enforce it as written.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 44-510i, -510j, 77-603(a), -614, -614(b), -614(c), -621(c), -621(c)(8); K.S.A. 44-556, 77-602(j), -606
constitutional law—criminal procedure—juveniles—speedy trial
state v. owens
sedgwick district court—affirmed; court of appeals—affirmed
No. 115,441—november 1, 2019
FACTS: 17-year-old Owens charged with juvenile offenses related to stealing a car at gunpoint. Six months later, the juvenile case was dismissed and Owens was charged with aggravated robbery, criminal use of a weapon and criminal deprivation of property. Jury convicted him as charged in trial that began some 19 months after his arrest. Owens appealed, claiming in part the delay between his arrest and trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, finding right to speedy trial attached upon filing of the adult criminal charges, and the 13-month delay from that point until Owens’ trial was presumptively prejudicial. Review granted on Owens’ speedy trial claim that the delay was 19 rather than 13 months, and on State’s cross-petition alleging the panel erred in finding the length of delay presumptively prejudicial.
ISSUE: (1) Speedy trial
HELD: The federal and state constitutional right to a speedy trial applies to juvenile offender proceedings under the Revised Kansas Juvenile Justice Code, citing State v. Robinson, 56 Kan. App. 2d 567 (2018)(filed after briefs submitted in present case). Thus the delay in bringing Owens to trial was more than 19 months. Factors in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), are applied, finding no violation of Owens’ constitutional speedy trial rights. A presumption of prejudice arose from the length of a delay that was excessive given the relative simplicity of the case, but reasons for the delay weigh against Owens under facts in this case. While he complained about the delay, evidence supports that he wanted his attorney to seek consolidation of his cases and that these efforts resulted in some delay. And Owens made no showing he was prejudiced by the delay. Judgment of court of appeals affirming the district court is affirmed.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3402(g), 38-2301 et seq., K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3208(7); K.S.A. 20-3018(b)
Kansas Court of Appeals
constitutional law—criminal procedure—discovery—evidence—sanctions
state v. auman
douglas district court—affirmed
No. 120,438—november 1, 2019
FACTS: While turning left with sun in his eyes, Auman hit a motorcyclist he had not seen. State charged him with aggravated battery while driving under the influence of alcohol and prescribed medications, and made repeated requests to police department for evidence. On Friday before Monday trial that was scheduled at the last date within speedy trial statute, dashcam videos were obtained and disclosed to the defense. In part, Auman filed motion to dismiss, arguing Brady violation because videos were produced too late to investigate three identified witnesses at the scene and comments between two officers that would tend to show the sun’s glare, not intoxication, caused the collision. Given State’s delay in providing information and video’s potential exculpatory value, compounded by the speedy trial issue, district court dismissed the criminal case. State appealed, claiming the district court abused its discretion in taking such drastic action.
ISSUE: Duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defense
HELD: District court’s dismissal of the case is affirmed. Due Process Clause does not force a defendant to bear burden of a lack of cooperation between prosecutor and law enforcement, which in this case resulted in the eleventh-hour disclosure of potentially exculpatory information that was within State’s possession since Auman’s collision. State could have waited to file case until it received all discovery information from law enforcement, or—through cooperative efforts of prosecutors and law enforcement—could have arranged for all discovery to be provided within time frame ordered by district court.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 8-1567(a), 21-5107(d), - 5413(b)(3)(A), 22-3212(i); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5413(b)(3)(A)