Posted By Administration,
Tuesday, November 12, 2019
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Kansas Court of Appeals
constitutional law—criminal procedure—motions—trials —statutes
state v. HAMMERSCHMIDT
Ellis District Court—reversed and remanded
no. 120,016—november 8, 2019
FACTS: Hammerschmidt was charged with a misdemeanor DUI. He filed motion to suppress evidence from the stop, arguing he was not given proper notices before the breath test. He also referenced two pending decisions awaiting rehearing in Kansas Supreme Court. District court granted continuances on its own initiative, citing the pending rehearing decisions. 607 days after a motion to suppress was filed, and 360 days after State v. Nece, 306 Kan. 679 (2017) (Nece II), and State v. Ryce, 306 Kan. 682 (2017) (Ryce II), the district court denied the motion to suppress. Hammerschmidt filed motion to dismiss, alleging violation of speedy trial statute. District court granted that motion and dismissed the complaint. State appealed, arguing in part that K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3402(g) bars dismissal.
ISSUE: Speedy trial statute
HELD: District court erred by dismissing the case on statutory speedy trial grounds. Hammerschmidt first requested delay in the case by filing motion to suppress, and that delay was originally attributable to him. Because the matter was taken under advisement for an unreasonable amount of time and because it was unclear if Hammerschmidt consented to the delay, district court later attributed the delay to the State. Although the delay here was several hundred days, the legislature removed the remedy of dismissal when a district court later attributes delays to the State that were originally attributable to a defendant. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3402(g). Hammerschmidt did not argue that prosecutorial misconduct precipitated the lengthy delay or that application of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3402(g) violated his constitutional speedy trial rights, and his statutory speedy trial claim is based on circumstances which expressly forbid dismissal on statutory speedy trial grounds.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3402, -3402(b), -3402(g)
constitutional law - criminal procedure - evidence - fourth amendment - motions
state v. fisher
Sedgwick District Court—affirmed
no. 120,031—november 8, 2019
FACTS: Officers entered the house in response to a 911 call report that someone in the house had been shot. No injured person was found, but officers discovered Fisher with drugs in plain view. Fisher was charged with drug offenses. He filed a motion to suppress, claiming the officers lacked a lawful justification to enter the house because they failed to first ask the two women standing outside the house any clarifying questions or whether they were injured. District court denied the motion, finding the clearing of the house to find if someone was hurt or dying was not unreasonable under the circumstances. Fisher was convicted in bench trial on stipulated facts. He filed timely appeal.
ISSUE: Emergency aid exception to warrantless search
HELD: District court did not err in denying the motion to suppress. The emergency aid exception test stated in State v. Neighbors, 299 Kan. 234 (2014), is applied, but an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals case is identified as more factually similar to the present case. Officers had authority under the emergency aid exception to act until assured that no one needed assistance. The mere presence of people outside the house where gunshots were reported did not remove the officer’s reasonable basis to search the house for victims. The possibility of someone suffering from a gunshot wound inside necessitated an immediate search.
state v. wilmore
shawnee district court—affirmed
no. 120,171—november 8, 2019
FACTS: Wilmore was convicted of two counts of indecent liberties with a child. On appeal, he claimed the district court imposed an illegal sentence in calculating criminal history by using two prior domestic battery cases that had been used in an earlier case to elevate the classification of a third domestic battering conviction to a felony.
ISSUE: Sentencing—criminal history calculation of prior domestic battery charges
HELD: Wilmore’s “double-counting” challenge is rejected for same reasons stated in numerous unpublished court of appeals decisions. District court did not violate K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6810(d) in calculating Wilmore’s criminal history score. Wilmore’s alternative interpretation of the statute is unreasonable. Under court’s longstanding interpretation of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6819(d), the unambiguous statutory language does not prohibit a district court from aggregating prior domestic battery person misdemeanors to create a person felony for criminal history purposes even when those same domestic battery convictions were used in an earlier case to elevate a domestic battery charge from a misdemeanor to a felony.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5414(c)(1)(C), -6810(d)(10), -6811(a), 22-3504(1)
K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-6810(d)(9)
Ellis District Court
Sedgwick District Court
Shawnee District Court
Posted By Administration,
Monday, November 4, 2019
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Kansas Supreme Court
VIA CHRISTI HOSPITALS V. KAN-PAK, LLC
WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD—COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED,
WORKERS COMPENSATION BOARD IS AFFIRMED
NO. 116,692—NOVEMBER 1, 2019
FACTS: Darin Pinion was severely burned while working at Kan-Pak. Via Christi provided medical care; his total bills exceeded $1 million. Kan-Pak's workers compensation insurance was provided by Travelers, who contracted with Paradigm to coordinate complicated cases. Paradigm paid only $136,451.60 of Pinion's considerable bill, under the 2011 Schedule of Medical Fees. For the 2011 Maximum Fee Schedule, language was added which allowed insurers to pay the lesser of the 70 percent stop loss calculation or the MS-DRG formula. It is unknown how the "lesser of" language ended up in the statute, as no one from the agency claimed knowledge of the addition. Via Christi requested reimbursement of 70% of Pinion's total bill. An ALJ found that the language in the regulation controlled and that it was without authority to ignore the "lesser of" language. The Board agreed and Via Christi appealed. The Court of Appeals reasoned that if no one at the agency knew that the "lesser of" language was added, that change was not properly promulgated and was ineffective. The Court of Appeals was unwilling to enforce an accidental rule, believing the outcome would be arbitrary and capricious. Paradigm's petition for review was granted.
ISSUES: (1) Jurisdiction, (2) effectiveness of the 2011 regulation
HELD: Jurisdiction exists to hear the merits of the case. The director of workers compensation is ultimately responsible for preparing the fee schedule. He is not a party to this action and the faulty rulemaking was not raised as a cause of action. The issue of rulemaking by the director—accidental or otherwise—was never properly before the Board on appeal from the hearing officer. These proceedings were initiated as a fee dispute under a narrowly-drawn statute. It was not arbitrary or capricious to follow a plainly-worded regulation and enforce it as written.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 44-510i, -510j, 77-603(a), -614, -614(b), -614(c), -621(c), -621(c)(8); K.S.A. 44-556, 77-602(j), -606
constitutional law—criminal procedure—juveniles—speedy trial
state v. owens
sedgwick district court—affirmed; court of appeals—affirmed
No. 115,441—november 1, 2019
FACTS: 17-year-old Owens charged with juvenile offenses related to stealing a car at gunpoint. Six months later, the juvenile case was dismissed and Owens was charged with aggravated robbery, criminal use of a weapon and criminal deprivation of property. Jury convicted him as charged in trial that began some 19 months after his arrest. Owens appealed, claiming in part the delay between his arrest and trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, finding right to speedy trial attached upon filing of the adult criminal charges, and the 13-month delay from that point until Owens’ trial was presumptively prejudicial. Review granted on Owens’ speedy trial claim that the delay was 19 rather than 13 months, and on State’s cross-petition alleging the panel erred in finding the length of delay presumptively prejudicial.
ISSUE: (1) Speedy trial
HELD: The federal and state constitutional right to a speedy trial applies to juvenile offender proceedings under the Revised Kansas Juvenile Justice Code, citing State v. Robinson, 56 Kan. App. 2d 567 (2018)(filed after briefs submitted in present case). Thus the delay in bringing Owens to trial was more than 19 months. Factors in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), are applied, finding no violation of Owens’ constitutional speedy trial rights. A presumption of prejudice arose from the length of a delay that was excessive given the relative simplicity of the case, but reasons for the delay weigh against Owens under facts in this case. While he complained about the delay, evidence supports that he wanted his attorney to seek consolidation of his cases and that these efforts resulted in some delay. And Owens made no showing he was prejudiced by the delay. Judgment of court of appeals affirming the district court is affirmed.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3402(g), 38-2301 et seq., K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 22-3208(7); K.S.A. 20-3018(b)
Kansas Court of Appeals
constitutional law—criminal procedure—discovery—evidence—sanctions
state v. auman
douglas district court—affirmed
No. 120,438—november 1, 2019
FACTS: While turning left with sun in his eyes, Auman hit a motorcyclist he had not seen. State charged him with aggravated battery while driving under the influence of alcohol and prescribed medications, and made repeated requests to police department for evidence. On Friday before Monday trial that was scheduled at the last date within speedy trial statute, dashcam videos were obtained and disclosed to the defense. In part, Auman filed motion to dismiss, arguing Brady violation because videos were produced too late to investigate three identified witnesses at the scene and comments between two officers that would tend to show the sun’s glare, not intoxication, caused the collision. Given State’s delay in providing information and video’s potential exculpatory value, compounded by the speedy trial issue, district court dismissed the criminal case. State appealed, claiming the district court abused its discretion in taking such drastic action.
ISSUE: Duty to disclose evidence favorable to the defense
HELD: District court’s dismissal of the case is affirmed. Due Process Clause does not force a defendant to bear burden of a lack of cooperation between prosecutor and law enforcement, which in this case resulted in the eleventh-hour disclosure of potentially exculpatory information that was within State’s possession since Auman’s collision. State could have waited to file case until it received all discovery information from law enforcement, or—through cooperative efforts of prosecutors and law enforcement—could have arranged for all discovery to be provided within time frame ordered by district court.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 8-1567(a), 21-5107(d), - 5413(b)(3)(A), 22-3212(i); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5413(b)(3)(A)
Douglas County Court
Sedgwick District Court
Workers Compensation Board
Posted By Administration,
Monday, December 18, 2017
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Kansas Supreme Court
constitutional law—criminal procedures—statutes
state v. amos
wyandotte district court—affirmed
No. 115,925—december 15, 2017
FACTS: Amos’ 1999 convictions of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery were affirmed on direct appeal. In 2015, he filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, seeking relief under 2014 Kansas decisions and under 2013 legislation (now codified at K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6620) enacted in response to Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), to require jury findings before an enhanced mandatory minimum sentence can be imposed for first-degree murder. District court summarily denied the motion. Amos appealed, arguing for the first time that K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6620(f), which makes the 2013 amendment inapplicable to sentences that were final before June 17, 2013, violates the Equal Protection Clause.
ISSUE: Motion to correct illegal sentence
HELD: A claim that a sentence is illegal because it violates the constitution cannot be brought via K.S.A. 22-3504(1). Nor can a K.S.A. 22-3504(1) motion to correct an illegal sentence serve as the procedural vehicle for attacking the constitutionality of K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6620(f). Impact of 2017 amendment of K.S.A. 22-3504 is not considered in this case.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6620, -6620(f); K.S.A. 22-3504(1)
constitutional law—criminal procedure—sentencing
state v. campbell
sedgwick district court—affirmed
No. 114,814—december 15, 2017
FACTS: Campbell was convicted in 1996 of first-degree murder and multiple crimes. In calculating criminal history for application of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), district court classified several of Campbell’s out-of-state convictions as person felonies. In 2015, Campbell filed motion to correct an illegal sentence, citing State v. Murdock, 299 Kan. 312 (2014). District court summarily denied relief, refusing to apply Murdock retroactively. Murdock was later overruled by State v. Keel, 302 Kan. 560 (2015). Campbell appealed claiming: (1) his sentence was illegal under Murdock; (2) application of Keel to Campbell’s motion violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; (3) KSGA’s person/nonperson classification of pre-KSGA offenses violates the Sixth Amendment; and (4) summary denial of his motion denied him his right under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) to a hearing. Appeal transferred to the Kansas Supreme Court.
ISSUES: (1) Classification of out-of-state convictions, (2) Ex Post Facto Clause, (3) Sixth Amendment, (4) summary denial
HELD: Campbell was not entitled to have his out-of-state convictions classified as nonperson offenses under Murdock which was overruled by Keel, and is not entitled to relief under holding in Keel. Impact of 2017 amendment of K.S.A. 22-3504 is not addressed.
Application of Keel in this case does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. The 1993 statutes interpreted in Keel were in effect when Campbell committed crimes in 1996. They are not laws that increased the potential punishment after Campbell’s crimes were committed.
Holding in State v. Collier, 306 Kan. 521 (2017), defeats Campbell’s Sixth Amendment claim.
Campbell mistakenly relies on 2017 amendment to K.S.A. 22-3504 which was not effective until after Campbell’s hearing. Under law that applied at the time of Campbell’s hearing, he had no right to be present for the court’s preliminary review or to demand a hearing at which he could be present.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6810(d), -6810(e), 22-3601(b)(3); K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 21-4710; K.S.A. 21-4711, 22-3504, -3504(1)
state v. hilt
johnson district court—affirmed
No. 114,682—december 15, 2017
FACTS: Hilt was convicted of first-degree murder. Conviction affirmed, but hard-50 sentence vacated and remanded for resentencing in accord with Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). On remand, district court replaced a juror who had consulted a high school yearbook in violation of the court’s repeated admonitions, and was not forthright when questioned. District court imposed hard-50 sentence pursuant to jury’s verdict. Hilt appealed claiming: (1) district court’s removal of the juror during deliberation was error because the juror was not doing internet research on the case, and the juror’s failure to be forthright was not a proper basis for dismissal; (2) prosector erred during closing argument by telling jury that its role was to determine whether Hilt would get hard 50 sentence or be eligible for parole in 25 years, and telling jury it did not have to determine which blows to the victim were inflicted by Hilt and which were inflicted by co-defendants; and (3) the district court’s pronouncement of sentence was illegal and violated his right to be present at sentencing
ISSUES: (1) Removal of juror, (2) prosecutorial error, (3) pronouncement of sentence
HELD: No abuse of district court’s discretion to remove and replace a juror. Under facts in case, juror who consulted the yearbook violated the judge’s admonitions to do no investigation of any matter outside the courtroom. Judge’s express skepticism of the juror’s honesty was not an independent basis for removal and replacement.
Statutory subsections governing Hilt’s crime made a hard-50 sentence mandatory once a jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that an aggravating circumstance existed that was not outweighed by any applicable mitigating circumstances. District judge had no discretion to deviate from the jury’s hard-50 verdict, and prosecutor did not misstate the law. Nor did prosecutor misstate the law by telling jurors they could vote for hard-50 sentence even if State did not prove which co-defendant inflicted specific blows or wounds.
District judge’s statements in open court, that appropriateness of imposing the hard-50 sentence was the jury’s decision which the court was going to follow and impose, did not create an illegal ambiguity in the length of Hilt’s sentence or violate his right to be present at sentencing.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6620(c), -6620(d), -6620(e), -6620(e)(1), -6620(e)(5), -6623, -6624(f), -6625, -6625(a), -6625(a)(4), 22-3405, -3412(c); K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 21-6620, -6624; K.S.A. 22-3424, -3504(3)
crimes and punishment—criminal procedure—juries—sentencing
state v. ruiz-ascencio
lyon district court—convictions affirmed—sentence vacated in part— remanded
No. 115,343—december 15, 2017
FACTS: Ruiz-Ascencio was convicted of attempted first-degree murder, first-degree murder, aggravated assault, and illegal use of a communication facility. District court imposed hard-25 sentence for first-degree murder, prison terms for the other three offenses, and lifetime post-release supervision on all four counts. Ruiz-Ascencio appealed claiming the district court: (1) erred by not instructing jury on voluntary manslaughter for the first-degree murder and attempted first-degree murder charges because both victims were shot during a sudden quarrel; and (2) imposed an illegal sentence by ordering lifetime post-release supervision on each count.
ISSUES: (1) Jury instructions, (2) sentencing
HELD: Kansas cases are reviewed. Under facts in this case, a voluntary manslaughter instruction was not factually appropriate. No facts or reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom to suggest a sudden quarrel, or that Ruiz-Ascencio otherwise acted in a heat of passion. One victim’s words or gestures were not enough to constitute legally sufficient provocation.
State concedes error in sentencing. Judgment imposing lifetime post-release supervision on all four counts is vacated as contrary to K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 22-3717. Remanded for resentencing.
CONCURRENCE (Johnson, J.): Concurs in the result.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5404(1), 22-3717, -3717(b)(2)(C), -3717(d)(1)(A), -3717(d)(1)(C); K.S.A. 21-5404, 22-3504
Kansas Court of Appeals
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS—TORTS
BONNETTE V. TRIPLE D AUTO PARTS
HAMILTON DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 116,578—DECEMBER 15, 2017
FACTS: Triple D Auto Parts purchased its store in 1990. At that time, the building's exterior had not changed since its construction in 1925. One feature of the exterior was a step down from the entrance/exit door to the sidewalk. Bonnette, who was a regular customer, fell when leaving the store and badly broke her wrist. Although she had navigated the step on dozens of occasions, she alleged that she fell because she could not see the step. Bonnette filed suit against Triple D, claiming negligence. Triple D responded by claiming that it was protected by the statute of repose. The district court granted Triple D's motion for summary judgment on those grounds, and this appeal followed.
ISSUES: (1) Applicability of the statute of repose; (2) duty to warn
HELD: The facts show that Triple D failed to warn Bonnette about the dangerous step. Because the duty to warn is an ongoing duty, that duty was breached on the day Bonnette was injured. This ongoing duty prevents application of the statute of repose. But, Bonnette had actual knowledge of the step, and the danger was open and obvious. There is no evidence that Bonnette was distracted when leaving the store. Because Triple D did not have a duty to warn it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 60-513, -513(b)
limitations of actions
Posted By Administration,
Tuesday, December 5, 2017
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Kansas Supreme Court
ORDER OF INDEFINITE SUSPENSION
IN THE MATTER OF HARRY LOUIS NAJIM
NO. 116,943 – DECEMBER 1, 2017
FACTS: This disciplinary matter arose after Najim was caught offering to provide legal services to an undercover agent engaged in a conspiracy to commit wire fraud and contraband cigarette trafficking. Najim's retainer was paid in cash, and Najim did not notify his law firm about the payment in excess of $10,000 cash so that it could report the payment to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network. The failure to report is a Class D federal felony, and after a conviction a hearing panel determined that Najim violated Rule 8.4(b) (commission of a criminal act reflecting adversely on the lawyer's honesty).
HEARING PANEL: Najim pled guilty to one of the 44 counts that were filed against him in federal court. But after the disciplinary administrator filed its complaint, Najim denied that his conduct violated Rule 8.4(b). The disciplinary administrator asked that Najim's license be suspended indefinitely, retroactive to a temporary suspension that was entered after criminal charged were first filed. Najim thought that a 2-year suspension was appropriate, retroactive to May 2015. A majority of the hearing panel ultimately recommended that Najim be suspended for three years, with suspension running from the date of the Supreme Court's opinion.
HELD: Although Najim disputes the idea that he committed a crime, the record of criminal judgment was admitted into evidence during the disciplinary hearing. That judgment is conclusive evidence that a crime was committed. And the crime of which Najim was convicted was one of dishonesty. The evidence before the court warrants an indefinite suspension from the practice of law.
IN THE MATTER OF BRANDY L SUTTON
NO. 117,395 – DECEMBER 1, 2017
FACTS: A hearing panel found that Brandy L. Sutton violated KRPC 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation). The complaint arose after a former employee accused Sutton of failing to make promised contributions to that employee's individual retirement account. A review by the employee revealed a shortfall of almost $9,000. Sutton disputed the amount but acknowledged there were some shortfalls which were caused by the law firm's financial distress. And, Sutton claimed, that distress was caused by the employee's negligence.
HEARING PANEL: After being notified of these issues, Sutton made whole not only the complaining employee but also other employees whose IRAs were not properly funded. The disciplinary administrator asked that Sutton be indefinitely suspended, although he acknowledged that a shorter term might be appropriate. Sutton asked that she be allowed to continue practicing law, subject to a probation plan. The hearing panel agreed with Sutton that probation was a good option for Sutton.
HELD: The hearing panel's findings were adopted. The court found that Sutton's behavior was, essentially, conversion, and that conversion historically warrants a more severe sanction than probation. Accordingly, a majority of the court elected to impose a three-year suspension, subject to lifting the suspension after six months upon application. A minority of the court would have approved the probationary plan suggested by the hearing panel.
NEGLIGENCE – TORTS
MCELHANEY V. THOMAS
RILEY DISTRICT COURT – AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, REMANDED
COURT OF APPEALS – AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART
NO. 111,590 – DECEMBER 1, 2017
FACTS: Thomas was driving a pick-up truck when he ran over McElhaney's feet in a school parking lot. It is undisputed that Thomas was driving, but there was no agreement about his state of mind at the time. Thomas claimed it was purely an accident. McElhaney testified that Thomas told her that he just meant to "bump" her with the truck. McElhaney brought claims for both negligence and intentional tort theories. She later asked to amend her petition to include a claim for punitive damages, but that request was denied. The district court also dismissed her intentional tort claim, finding there was no evidence of an intent to injure. The Court of Appeals agreed with this assessment. And a majority of the panel upheld the district court's ruling disallowing a claim for punitive damages. This appeal followed after McElhaney's petition for review was granted.
ISSUE: Standard for proving tort of civil battery
HELD: An intent to injure is a necessary element of the tort of battery in Kansas. This includes both the intent to do actual harm and the intent to cause an offensive contact. A person may be guilty of civil battery if the defendant intends to make an offensive contact and bodily harm results. In so ruling, the court does away with the concept of "horseplay" as a legal category. And because McElhaney should have been allowed to bring her battery claim, the district court also erred by not permitting McElhaney to amend her petition and claim punitive damages.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 60-3703
constitutional law – criminal procedure – sentencing – statutes
state v. simmons
saline district court – affirmed; court of appeals – affirmed
No. 108,885 – december 1, 2017
FACTS: Simmons convicted of drug offense in 2005. Prior to her release on parole, Kansas Offender Registration Act (KORA) was amended to require registration of drug offenders. When Simmons was charged with failing to register, district court found her guilty and ordered payment of $200 DNA database fee. On appeal Simmons claimed: (1) the retroactive application of the KORA registration requirement violated the Ex Post Facto Clause; (2) it was error to impose the DNA database fee because she would have provided a DNA sample before her release on parole; and (3) even if the KORA registration was not punishment, it was part of her 2005 sentence which could not be modified by the executive branch. Court of Appeals affirmed. 50 Kan.App.2d 448 (2014). Simmons’ petition for review granted.
ISSUES: (1) Ex Post Facto Challenge, (2) Modification of Sentence, (3) DNA Database Fee
HELD: Under State v. Petersen–Beard, 304 Kan. 192 (2016), lifetime sex offender registration does not constitute “punishment” for Eighth Amendment and ex post facto challenges. Record in this appeal is insufficient to demonstrate that drug offenders as a class are distinguishable from the class of sex offenders such that KORA registration becomes punitive rather than civil when applied to drug offenders.
Challenge to authority of executive branch to order Simmons to register is issue of first impression. Simmons’ 2005 criminal sentence is not illegal, and has not been “modified” by the post–sentencing registration obligation.
District court did not err by imposing the DNA database fee required by K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 75–724. Simmons failed to show that she previously paid a DNA database fee or that she did not submit a DNA sample for the current offense.
DISSENT (Beier, J., joined by Rosen and Johnson, JJ.): Consistent with dissent in Petersen–Beard, Kansas offender registration requirement is punishment for sex or violent offender, and no less so for drug offender. Simmons met burden of showing an ex post facto violation in this case.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2012 Supp. 75–724, –724(a)–(b); K.S.A. 22–4901 et seq.
appeals – criminal procedure – juries
state v. mcbride
shawnee district court – reversed
court of appeals – reversed
No. 112,277 – december 1, 2017
FACTS: McBride convicted of kidnapping. On appeal he claimed he was denied a fair trial because prosecutor asserted the alleged victim deserved consideration similar to the presumption of innocence constitutionally recognized for criminal defendants. In unpublished opinion, Court of Appeals agreed that this was prosecutorial error but found the error was harmless under State v. Tosh, 278 Kan. 83 (2004). Review granted on this issue.
ISSUE: Prosecutorial Error – Harmless Error
HELD: No cross–petition of panel’s determination that the prosecutor misstated the law, so only issue on appeal is whether this prosecutorial error was harmless. Harmless error inquiry in Tosh was abandoned in State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88 (2016). Applying Sherman to facts in this case, where prosecutor improperly tried to bolster victim’s credibility by claiming she deserved a credibility presumption akin to McBride’s presumption of innocence, denied McBride a fair trial. Kidnapping conviction is reversed and case is remanded to district court.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21–5408(a)(3); K.S.A. 20–3018(b), 60–261, –2101(b)
criminal procedure – habeas corpus – sentencing
state v. buford
wyandotte district court – affirmed
No. 114,175 – december 1, 2017
FACTS: Buford is serving a life sentence imposed for 1990 felony murder conviction. e filed 2014 motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing the parole board instituted a new sentence each time it denied him parole, and these “sentences” were illegal because the parole board should have classified his pre–1993 crime as a nonperson felony. District court summarily denied the motion. Buford appealed.
ISSUE: Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence
HELD: The denial of parole is not a sentence, so K.S.A. 22–3504 has no application. Claim is not construed as habeas motion because it is not clear Buford has exhausted administrative remedies.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 22–3504, 60–1501; K.S.A. 21–5401(a), 22–3717(b) (Ensley 1988)