Kansas Supreme Court
ORDER OF DISBARMENT
IN THE MATTER OF LAURENCE M. JARVIS
NO. 07012 – JANUARY 8, 2019
FACTS: In a letter addressed to the Clerk of the Appellate Courts, Laurence M. Jarvis voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law in Kansas. At the time of surrender, Jarvis' license was indefinitely suspended and he faced an additional formal hearing on allegations of misconduct.
HELD: The Court accepted the surrender of Jarvis' license and ordered that he be disbarred.
ORDER OF DISBARMENT
IN THE MATTER OF JOHN M. KNOX
NO. 119,254 – JANUARY 11, 2019
FACTS: The Disciplinary Administrator filed a formal complaint against Knox which alleged violations of KRPC 1.1 (competence); 1.3 (diligence); 1.4(a) (communication); 1.5(d) (fees); 3.2 (expediting litigation); 4.1(a) (truthfulness in statements to others); 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice); (8.4)(g) (engaging in conduct adversely reflecting on a lawyer's fitness to practice law); and Rule 207(b) (failure to cooperate in a disciplinary action). The matter arose after Knox was retained to represent clients in a personal injury matter. He failed to perform any of the duties for which he was hired and failed to communicate with his clients. Knox failed to respond once the formal complaint was filed.
HEARING PANEL: The panel determined that although Knox failed to appear he was given appropriate service and notice of the formal hearing. There was adequate evidence to show that Knox committed the violations as alleged in the complaint. The hearing panel found a number of aggravating circumstances, including the vulnerability of the client and Knox's patterns of misconduct. Knox's failure to participate in the disciplinary proceeding meant there were no mitigating circumstances to consider. The Disciplinary Administrator recommended that Knox be disbarred and the hearing panel agreed.
HELD: Knox did not appear at the hearing before the Kansas Supreme Court. The court determined that there was clear and convincing evidence that Knox violated multiple rules of professional conduct. The Disciplinary Administrator continued to recommend disbarment and the court agreed. Knox is disbarred.
ORDER OF DISCHARGE FROM PROBATION
IN THE MATTER OF SUSAN L. BOWMAN
NO. 109,512 – JANUARY 9, 2019
FACTS: The court suspended Bowman's license to practice law in Kansas on October 18, 2013, for a period of 12 months. Bowman was required to undergo a reinstatement hearing prior to reconsideration being considered. After the hearing, Bowman was reinstated and placed on probation. Bowman filed a motion for discharge from probation in November 2018, along with affidavits demonstrating compliance with the terms of probation. The Disciplinary Administrator did not object.
HELD: After reviewing the motions and affidavits, and the response of the Disciplinary Administrator, the court grants Bowman's motion for discharge from probation.
NAUHEIM V. CITY OF TOPEKA
SHAWNEE DISTRICT COURT – REVERSED and REMANDED
COURT OF APPEALS – AFFIRMED
NO. 114,271 – JANUARY 11, 2019
FACTS: The City of Topeka negotiated with business owners to purchase land in order to build a drainage system for city property. The negotiations resulted in the City's purchase of the property and the businesses' relocation without the use of eminent domain power. After the move, the business owners sued the City for relocation costs under K.S.A. 26-518, which allows for costs when real property is acquired by a condemning authority through negotiation in advance of a condemnation action. The City countered that it never intended to condemn the property and also noted that the business owners were not "displaced persons" under the statute because the property was actually owned by a landlord. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, holding that the business owners were not displaced persons and that the property acquisition was not made in advance of a condemnation. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the business owners were displaced persons. The panel remanded for further factual findings on the question of whether the purchase negotiations were conducted in advance of a condemnation. The business owners appealed the question of whether a displaced person must prove that a condemning authority threatened condemnation or took affirmative action towards condemnation prior to acquisition. That petition for review was granted. The City did not cross-petition on the Court of Appeals' other findings.
ISSUES: (1) Must a displaced person prove that a condemning authority had an intent to condemn in order to receive statutory relocation assistance
HELD: K.S.A. 26-518 requires a condemning authority to pay relocation costs when an acquisition occurs through negotiation before a condemnation action or when an acquisition actually occurs through condemnation. Nothing in the statute requires the City to pay relocation benefits as part of any public project. Whether a negotiation occurs "in advance of" a condemnation action is a question of fact that must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 26-201, -501(a), -518, -518(a); K.S.A. 12-101, Second, -101, Fourth
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – DISCOVERY – MOTIONS – STATUTES
STATE V. ROBINSON
SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT – AFFIRMED
No. 116,650 – JANUARY 11, 2019
FACTS: Robinson convicted of capital murder and other crimes. Life prison term without parole imposed with a 247 additional months. Convictions and sentence affirmed in direct appeal. 293 Kan. 1002 (2012). He filed 2015 motion under K.S.A. 60-237 citing Brady v Maryland,373 U.S. 83 (11963) and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), to compel exculpatory discovery of detective who had testified at his trial. District court denied the motion finding no rule of criminal procedure allowing for such a motion, and the State had asserted there was no such information to produce. Robinson appealed.
ISSUE: Postconviction Motion
HELD: District court’s decision is affirmed. Nothing in K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-237 permits a postconviction motion to compel discovery in a criminal case.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 60-234, -237, -237(a)(1)-(3), -237(a)(3)(B)(iv)
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – SENTENCES- STATUTES
STATE V. AYERS
WYANDOTTE DISTRICT COURT – AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, REMANDED
No. 117,654 – JANUARY 11, 2019
FACTS: Ayers convicted on guilty pleas to multiple felonies related to a murder. Sentencing court imposed consecutive sentences consecutive to a life sentence without possibility of parole, and assessed BIDS fees. Ayers appealed claiming the district judge failed to consider on the record Ayers’ ability to pay the assessed BIDS fees. He also claimed the district judge abused its discretion by ordering most of the on-grid sentences to run consecutively to a life sentence with no possibility of parole.
ISSUES: (1) BIDS. Fees, (2) Sentences
HELD: Pursuant to State v. Robinson, 281 Kan. 538 (2006), the BIDS fee assessment must be vacated and case remanded for reconsideration of that fee. Court rejects State’s argument that there is no additional fact-finding any court must do to resolve the issue of BIDS fess, and that the BIDS fee assessed was “unworkable” as found in restitution statute.
No abuse of discretion in district court’s sentencing in this case. Recognized purposes of sentencing go beyond pure incapacitation, and include retribution for Ayers’ other crimes. Also, sentencing defendants to terms of imprisonment they are unlikely to serve is common.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6604(b)(1); K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 22-4513, -4513(b)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – CRIMINAL PROCEDURE – MOTIONS – STATUTES
STATE V. SAMUEL
WYANDOTTE DISTRICT COURT – AFFIRMED
No. 116,423 – JANUARY 11, 2019
FACTS: Samuel convicted of second-degree murder. Nineteen years later, citing Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), he filed motion to correct an illegal sentence and claiming his life sentence with mandatory 10-year terms violates the Eighth Amendment because he was 16 years old when he committed the crime. District court summarily dismissed the motion, holding a motion to correct an illegal sentence was not a proper vehicle to challenge a sentence as unconstitutional. Samuel appealed.
ISSUE: Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence
HELD: District court’s judgment is affirmed. Samuel’s Eighth Amendment claims do not fit within the definition of an “illegal sentence.” They do not implicate the sentencing court’s jurisdiction, and a motion to correct an illegal sentence under the statute cannot raise claims that the sentence violates a constitutional provision.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3504(3), -3601(b)(3)-(4); K.S.A> 22-3504, -3504(1); K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-3402(a)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – EVIDENCE – FOURTH AMENDMENT – SEARCH AND SEIZURE
STATE V. DOELZ
LEAVENWORTH DISTRICT COURT – REVERSED AND REMANDED; COURT OF APPEALS – REVERSED
No. 113,165 – JANUARY 11, 2019
FACTS: Investigating a recent bank robbery by two black males, officer stopped vehicle in which Doelz was a passenger. Officer seized a box he observed on the back seat. When opened, the box contained a digital scale. Methamphetamine then found in search of the vehicle. Doelz arrested and convicted on drug charge. He appealed, claiming district court erred in denying motion to suppress evidence obtained in an unlawful search. Doelz argued in part: (1) the investigatory detention was unlawfully extended once officer discovered all in the car were white males; (B) officer unlawfully seized the digital scale without a warrant or a valid exception to the warrant requirement; and (c) officer lacked probable cause to search the whole vehicle. Court of Appeals affirmed in unpublished opinion. Doelz’s petition for review granted.
ISSUE: Lawfulness of Vehicle Search
HELD: Under totality of the circumstances which included a report the bank robbery car was driven by a white male, reasonable suspicion for the investigatory detention was not unlawfully extended. However, the search of the box retrieved from the backseat was unlawful. Plain-view exception did not permit further search of the box without a warrant or another established exception. Absent consideration of this alleged drug paraphernalia seized from the vehicle at the time of the stop, the remaining circumstances were insufficient to establish a fair probability the vehicle contained contraband. District court thus erred in finding the automobile exception to the warrant requirement applied. Panel’s decision to affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to suppress is reversed. Matter is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 22-2402
Kansas Court of Appeals
DIVORCE – JUDGMENTS
IN RE MARRIAGE OF STROM
RILEY DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 118,676—JANUARY 11, 2019
FACTS: The Stroms married in 1986 and divorced in 1995. At the time of the divorce, Eric was retired from the military and was receiving military retirement benefits. In the property settlement agreement, Eric agreed to give Christina a portion of these retirement benefits. Although the agreement was incorporated into the divorce decree, Eric never made any of the required payments. Almost 22 years later, Eric moved to have the district court declare this division of his military retirement pay a void and unenforceable judgment. He claimed the judgment was dormant because Christina failed to file a renewal affidavit within five years of the divorce and did not revive the judgment within seven years of the divorce. Christina countered by moving to enforce and revive the judgment. The district court agreed with Christina and held that any payment due after September 1, 2010, was revived and enforceable. Eric appealed.
ISSUES: (1) Ability to revive the judgment
HELD: Because Eric and Christina were not married for 10 years, she was unable to file a QDRO and obtain direct payment from the military finance center. The only way the judgment could have been fulfilled was by direct payment from Eric. These payments had to be treated like monthly installment payments. As such, the dormancy period for each individual payment started when it became due and collectable. Christina can now execute on the last five years of judgments and can revive the judgments for the two years preceding that.
DISSENT: (Buser, J.) Christina had an obligation to attempt to enforce her judgment. Because she didn't, the judgment is unenforceable and should be extinguished.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-2403, -2403(a)(1), -2403(c)
EQUITY – JURISDICTION – WATER RIGHTS
GARETSON BROTHERS V. AMERICAN WARRIOR, INC.
HASKELL DISTRICT COURT – AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART
NO. 117,404 – JANUARY 11, 2019
FACTS: Garetson Brothers owns water rights in Haskell County. It sought injunctive relief to prevent American Warrior, Inc. – the nearest junior rights holder – from impairing its water right. A referee found that American Warrior was substantially impairing Garetson's senior right and entered a temporary and then a permanent injunction prohibiting American Warrior from exercising its junior water rights. American Warrior appealed.
ISSUES: (1) Subject matter jurisdiction; (2) scope of the notice of appeal; (3) grant of permanent injunction
HELD: The amendments to K.S.A. 82a-716 and -717, which require a party to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking an injunction, did not apply retroactively in this matter. The court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear the merits of this appeal because American Warrior was not required to exhaust administrative remedies. In this civil case, the court only has jurisdiction to consider rulings which were specifically listed in the notice of appeal. The notice of appeal did not contain any "catch-all" language that would permit the court to consider additional rulings. A senior water right is still impaired even if the right holder has permission to pull water from a third party. There is no requirement that economic conditions be considered when determining whether a senior rights holder's usage is impaired. There is no evidence that Garetson had unclean hands in its prior water usage.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 60-102, -2103(b), 82a-701(d), -716, -717a; K.S.A. 82a-711(c), -716, -717a, -725