Posted By Patti Van Slyke,
Monday, August 3, 2020
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Kansas Court of Appeals
CITY OF SHAWNEE V. ADEM
JOHNSON DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 121,328—JULY 31, 2020
FACTS: Adem was convicted of sexual battery in Shawnee Municipal Court and he filed a notice of appeal to the district court. A jury convicted him as charged in district court. As part of his sentence, Adem was required to register as a sex offender under the Kansas Offender Registration Act. He now appeals that finding.
ISSUES: (1) Appellate jurisdiction; (2) applicability of KORA to municipal court convictions;
HELD: The court has jurisdiction to consider Adem's appeal because KORA allows for appeals where registration has been triggered by district court findings. KORA acts in concert with, but not as part of, the Kansas Code of Criminal Procedure or other sentencing statutes. It is its own separate act with its own regulatory purposes. Adem is correct that there is no statute that specifically applies KORA to violations of municipal codes. But K.S.A. 22-4902(b)(7) defines a sex offender as any person who has been convicted of an offense that is "comparable" to one specifically enumerated in the Act. The municipal sexual battery act is identical to the state statute, and Adem was properly required to register under KORA.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-4902(b)(5), -4902(b)(7), -4902(t)(1); K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3602, -3602(a); K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-5505(a); K.S.A. 22-2102, -2103; -3602, -3610(a), 46-1211(b)
CHALMERS V. BURROUGH
SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 121,108—JULY 31, 2020
FACTS: A Florida district court required Chalmers to pay Burrough child support to help care for their daughter. The support amount was based on Chalmers' income as a player for the Miami Heat basketball team. Chalmers retired from the team in 2018 and moved away from Florida. Burrough and the child are Kansas residents. After his employment changed, Chalmers wanted to modify his child support obligation. But he could not do so in Florida because he was no longer a Florida resident. In 2018, Chalmers filed a petition to register and modify the Florida order in Kansas under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). Burrough did not dispute Chalmers' attempt to register the judgment, even though he did not comply with UIFSA requirements by including copies of the Florida support order with the filing. The district court registered the Florida order in Kansas and later temporarily modified the support obligation as agreed to by the parties. Burrough then filed a motion to set aside, claiming that she never agreed to the terms. Chalmers also moved for permission to amend his petition to add the required copies of the Florida support order. Burrough countered with a motion to dismiss based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the Florida support order was never properly registered because Chalmers did not comply with UIFSA requirements when registering the order. The district court agreed with Burrough and vacated its modification of the support order, finding that the presence of a certified copy of the Florida support order was fundamental to registering the order in Kansas. Chalmers appealed.
ISSUES: (1) Whether objection to jurisdiction was waived; (2) whether substantial compliance with UIFSA is adequate
HELD: Kansas only has jurisdiction to modify an out-of-state child support order if that order is first registered in this state. It is undisputed that Chalmers failed to attach to his registration petition two copies, including one certified copy, of his Florida order. Challenges to subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time, even outside of the 20-day window contemplated by UIFSA. A Kansas court has no authority to modify an out-of-state child support order until that order is properly registered in Kansas. Litigants are not expected to strictly comply with UIFSA requirements. But attachment of the Florida order was a critical component of the UIFSA registration requirements. The failure to attach two copies of the order meant that Chalmers did not substantially comply with UIFSA and the order was never properly registered in Kansas, divesting the district court of jurisdiction to modify it.
DISSENT: (Atcheson, J.) UIFSA's procedural requirements should not be equated with subject matter jurisdiction. The district court had jurisdiction to modify Chalmers' out-of-state child support order.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 23-36,204(b), -36,205, -36,602(a), -36,602(b), -36,603(a), -36,605, -36,606, -36,607, 36,609, -36,610, -36,611(a)
HERNANDEZ V. PISTOTNIK
SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 120,228—JULY 31, 2020
FACTS: Yudi Hernandez was badly injured in an automobile accident at the age of 13. Yudi's older sister, Mirna, helped her family find an attorney to act on Yudi's behalf. A family friend recommended Brad Pistotnik based on Brad's television commercials. Yudi and her family had an initial consultation with Brian Pistotnik, and she retained the Pistotnik firm to represent her. The firm obtained settlement officers for policy limits from all involved parties. But Yudi's father fired the Pistotnik firm and hired Steven Brave to complete the settlement. Yudi received her settlement, but Brian sued her father to recover the costs and attorney fees that were detailed in an attorney fee lien. Yudi sued the Pistotnik firm, claiming they defrauded her under the Kansas Consumer Protection Act. Brad moved for summary judgment, claiming that there was no evidence of fraud and that Yudi was not an aggrieved party under the KCPA. The district court granted Brad's motion, and Yudi appealed.
ISSUES: (1) Applicability of the KCPA; (2) fraud claim; (3) viability of discovery requests; (4) transfer of venue
HELD: The KCPA does not define the term "aggrieved." But case law clarifies that in order to recover under the KCPA, Yudi must show that she was legally harmed and that her harm was causally connected to Brad's advertising. The filing of the attorney fee lien did not harm Yudi. And Yudi cannot show that she relied on any representations in Brad's advertisements when hiring the firm—she was in a medically-induced coma at the time and played no part in the decision of which firm to hire. The district court correctly found that Yudi cannot recover under the KCPA. When alleging fraud, the circumstances constituting fraud must be stated with particularity. Yudi failed to establish that she relied, either directly or indirectly, on any fraudulent representation by the Pistotniks. Complaints to the Kansas Disciplinary Administrator are not discoverable, and the district court did not err by refusing to require Brad or Brian to turn over such documents to Yudi. And settlement agreements which Yudi wanted to obtain in discovery were confidential, meaning the district court did not err by refusing to compel their discovery. The district court did not abuse its discretion by transferring venue to Sedgwick County, where the defendants were located and where all the legal work was completed.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 60-208(a), -209(b), -226, -2103(h); K.S.A. 50-623(b), -634(a), 60-609(a)
state v. dunham
saline district court—affirmed in part, vacated in part, remanded
no. 121,081—july 31, 2020
FACTS: While on probation for drug crime convictions in two cases, Dunham committed additional crimes leading to three more cases, the last two committed while Dunham was on felony release status. Addressing all five cases the same day, district court revoked probation in Cases 1 and 2 and imposed consecutive prison sentences in the additional three cases, finding Kansas law required that sentences in Cases 4 and 5 run consecutive to each other and consecutive to Case 3. Dunham appealed claiming district court erred by concluding it lacked discretion to impose the last three sentences concurrently. He also claimed the district court abused its discretion by revoking probation, arguing drug treatment would better address his addiction.
ISSUES: (1) Multiple sentences; (2) probation revocation
HELD: District court erred in finding it had no discretion to impose Dunham’s sentences in Cases 3, 4, and 5 consecutive to each other. Law related to concurrent and consecutive sentencing in felony cases is examined including the interpretation of statutory language, the statutes and caselaw related to concurrent and consecutive sentences, and the application of applicable statutes to facts of Dunham’s case. Dunham had multiple sentences imposed on different cases on the same day, so this case is controlled by State v. Edwards, 252 Kan. 860 (1993), which interpreted the previous version of K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6606(a) as allowing a court flexibility—regardless of sentence ordered in any individual case such as the consecutive prison term in Dunham’s Case 3 sentence—to run the sentences in multiple cases concurrently or consecutively as the court finds appropriate. District court’s order running the sentences consecutively is vacated and case is remanded for court to use its discretion in deciding whether the sentences in Cases 4 and 5 should be consecutive to or concurrent with each other and to Case 3.
District court did not act unreasonably by revoking Dunham’s probation. Facts support the district court’s conclusion that Dunham was no longer amenable to probation.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-6601, -6604(f)(4), -6606(a), -6606(c), -6606(d), -6606(e); K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3716(c)(8)(A); K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6604(f)(4), -6606(d); K.S.A. 1996 Supp. 21-4603d, -4720(a); K.S.A. 1992 Supp. 21-4608(1), -4608(3); K.S.A. 1984 Supp. 21-4608, -4608(2), -4608(4), -4608(5); K.S.A. 21-4608(a), -4608(c), 22- 2801, -2802, -2804
Author: Patti Van Slyke
Johnson District Court
Saline District Court
Sedgwick District Court
Posted By Administration,
Monday, July 27, 2020
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Kansas Supreme Court
HABEAS CORPUS, RIGHT TO COUNSEL
BALBIRNIE V. STATE
FRANKLIN DISTRICT COURT—COURT OF APPEALS IS REVERSED
DISTRICT COURT IS REVERSED—CASE REMANDED
NO. 115,650—JULY 24, 2020
FACTS: Balbirnie was convicted of second-degree murder, and his conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Throughout that process, Balbirnie consistently proclaimed his innocence and blamed the murder on one of the other people present at the scene of the crime. Within one year of his conviction being affirmed, Balbirnie filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion in which he claimed trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and then introduce at trial a recording of a 911 call at which an eyewitness named another person as the murderer. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that trial counsel did not perform deficiently and even if he had, Balbirnie failed to establish prejudice. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court on the question of trial counsel's performance, finding that the failure to introduce the 911 call fell below an objective standard for reasonably effective representation. But the panel ultimately affirmed the district court, holding that this deficient performance did not prejudice Balbirnie. The Supreme Court granted Balbirnie's petition for review.
ISSUES: (1) Performance; (2) prejudice
HELD: Balbirnie prevailed in the Court of Appeals on the issue of deficient performance and did not seek review of that decision. The State did not file a cross-petition for review either, although case law existing at the time the petition was filed suggests such a filing was not necessary. A cursory glance at the Court of Appeals' decision shows that it correctly ruled that trial counsel's failure to introduce the 911 call was not a strategic decision was, in fact, objectively unreasonable. A review of the evidence in its totality shows that if the call had been introduced there was a reasonable probability the jury would have made a different decision. This is true even though there was evidence of Balbirnie's guilt.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 60-420, -1507
state v. martinez
shawnee district court—affirmed
no. 119,739—july 24, 2020
FACTS: Martinez convicted of first-degree premeditated murder and other crimes arising from a drive-by shooting. On appeal he claimed the prosecutor erred in closing arguments by saying “The defense has speculated about other peoples [sic] motives, but the State has actually presented evidence.” Martinez argues this impermissibly shifted the burden of proof and infringed on his constitutional protection against compulsory self-incrimination.
ISSUE: (1) Prosecutorial error
HELD: Prosecutor’s statements were within the wide latitude allowed in closing arguments. The comments, when read in context, appropriately explained how the evidence supported the State’s theory of the case, and did not offend Martinez’ constitutional right to a fair trial. Prosecutor did not comment on Martinez’ failure to testify or argue Martinez had to prove that he lacked a motive or that witnesses had a motive to lie. Prosecutor did not suggest the defense had any burden to do something in response to the State’s evidence or that 000Martinez needed to testify and explain his action. Nor did the prosecutor shift the burden or comment on Martinez’ failure to testify by pointing out the defense’s argument rested on an inference.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 60-439
criminal law—criminal procedure—jury instructions—
state v. thomas
chautauqua district court—affirmed in part, reversed in part,
vacated in part, remanded
court of appeals—affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part
no. 115,990—july 24, 2020
FACTS: Thomas convicted of aggravated battery, abuse of a child, and aggravated endangering of a child. On appeal he argued: (1) district court erred by giving jury instructions that allowed the jury to convict him of aggravated battery if it found he intended the conduct but not the harm; (2) prosecutor improperly inflamed the passions and prejudices of jurors during closing argument by showing them photos of the child’s injuries and repeatedly telling them to acquit only if the jurors thought it was acceptable to inflict such injuries on “your child;” (3) cumulative effect of these two errors denied him a fair trial; and (4) district court erroneously scored Thomas’ 2001 out-of-state Virginia conviction for domestic assault and battery as a person crime. Court of Appeals affirmed in unpublished opinion, finding in part the aggravated battery jury instruction was erroneous but the error was harmless, and prosecutor’s if-you-think-it’s-okay statements did not encourage jurors to consider factors outside the evidence and law. Review granted.
ISSUES: (1) Jury instructions—aggravated battery; (2) prosecutorial error; (3) cumulative error; (4) sentencing
HELD: District court’s aggravated battery instructions were erroneous. Under State v. Hobbs, 301 Kan. 203 (2015), “knowingly” in elements of aggravated battery means more than just proving the defendant intended to engage in the underlying conduct, and requires State to prove the defendant acted when he or she was aware the conduct was reasonably certain to cause the result.
Prosecutor’s If-you-think-it’s-okay statements were error. Panel’s reasons for finding that prosecutor’s statement did not encourage jurors to consider factors outside the evidence and law are examined and criticized as conflating the analysis of error with whether error was harmless. As to the child abuse charge the prosecutor’s error was harmless. Thomas’ conviction on this charge is affirmed. As to the aggravated battery charge for which instructional error was found, the combined impact of these errors must be considered.
Cumulative error denied Thomas a fair trial on the aggravated battery charge. The erroneous jury instruction allowed the jury to find guilt based on a less culpable intent than required by the statute, and State’s repeated comments urged jury to convict based on emotional consideration rather than a reasoned and deliberate consideration of facts and law. The aggravated battery conviction is reversed and case is remanded for a new trial on this charge.
Assault and battery, as defined by Virginia common law, is broader than Kansas battery and could encompass behavior that is not a crime in Kansas. Under State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552 (2018), district court incorrectly calculated Thomas’ criminal history score and should have scored the 2001 Virginia conviction as a nonperson crime. Remanded for resentencing.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6811(e); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5413, -5413(b), -5413(b)(1)(A), -5413(g), -5602, -6811(e), 22-3414(3)
Kansas Court of Appeals
IN RE MARRIAGE OF DAVIS AND GARCIA-BEBEK
SEDGWICK DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 121,110—JULY 24, 2020
FACTS: Davis and Garcia-Bebek divorced in 2014. They shared joint legal custody of two minor children and Garcia-Bebek had permission to take the children to visit family in his native country of Peru every other year. In 2018, Davis sought to be awarded sole legal custody of the children after Garcia-Bebek was charged with three federal crimes. Perhaps because of his legal issues, Garcia-Bebek moved back to Peru. But he asked for reasonable parenting time which would include having the children visit him in Peru for up to 30 days at a time. The district court initially ruled in Garcia-Bebek's favor but was swayed to reconsider by Davis's argument that Garcia-Bebek's crimes showed that he was untrustworthy, making international parental kidnapping a realistic possibility. Garcia-Bebek appealed.
ISSUE: (1) Parenting time outside of the United States
HELD: The district court did not prevent Garcia-Bebek from exercising his parenting time. It just prevented him from doing so in Peru. There was nothing to prevent Garcia-Bebek from visiting the children in their home country. It is undisputed that there is an outstanding indictment in a federal criminal case and a warrant for his arrest in Kansas. This evidence is sufficient to support the district court's decision preventing the children from visiting Garcia-Bebek in Peru.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 23-3203(a), -3208(a)
constitutional law—criminal procedure—probation—sentencing—statutes
state v. lyon
sedgwick district court—affirmed
no. 120,993—july 24, 2020
FACTS: Lyon convicted on his pleas to charges of aggravated battery, criminal possession of a firearm, and endangerment of a person. Pursuant to the plea agreement, district court imposed dispositional departure sentence of probation with underlying prison term. District court’s calculation of criminal history included Lyon’s 2010 Kansas aggravated burglary conviction as a person felony. Probation violation warrant issued four months later, alleging in part that Lyon committed the felony offense of aggravated battery/domestic violence. Trial judge revoked probation, finding Lyon had committed misdemeanor domestic battery. On appeal, Lyon claimed the trial court’s revocation of probation denied Lyon due process because the State failed to allege he committed a domestic battery in the probation violation. He also claimed his 2010 Kansas conviction should have been classified as a nonperson felony because the elements of the 2010 version of aggravated burglary are broader than the elements of the 2017 version of the crime.
ISSUES: (1) Due process—revocation of probation; (2) sentencing—criminal history
HELD: District court did not err in revoking Lyon’s probation. The warrant’s allegation that Lyon committed aggravated battery/domestic violence sufficiently notified him of what the State intended to prove, and it is uncontested that substantial competent evidence supports the trial court’s finding of domestic battery.
The identical-or-narrower test in State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552 (2018), which applies to out-of-state offenses and to Kansas offenses committed prior to the1993 implementation of the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act (KSGA), does not apply to the scoring of Lyon’s post-KSGA Kansas conviction. A post-KSGA Kansas crime is properly scored as a person offense if the crime was classified as a person offense when it was committed and when the current crime of conviction was committed and when the current crime of conviction was committed even if the prior version of the earlier crime’s elements are broader than the elements of the current version. Lyon’s alternative constitutional argument under Apprendi is not properly before the court and is not considered. Whether recodification and/or statutory amendments to aggravated burglary amounted to a repeal for purposes of K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-6810(d)(8) is examined, finding no such determination is required in this case. Regardless of the statutory amendments to aggravated burglary, district court properly scored Lyon’s prior conviction for aggravated burglary as a person offense.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2019 Supp. 21-5109(b), -5111(i), -6801 et seq., -6804(c), -6804(p), -6809, -6810, -6811(e)(1); K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5414(a), 22-3716, -3716(b)(1), -3716(c)(8)(A), -3716(c)(9)(B); K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 21-5807(b), -5807(b)(1), 5807(e), -6810(d), -6810(d)(8), -6810(d)(9), -6811(e)(3); K.S.A. 2011 Supp. 21-3715(a), -5103(d), -5413, -5427(3), -6811(d)(1); K.S.A. 21-3412, -3701, -3715, -3716, -4843, 22-3716
right to counsel
Posted By Administrator,
Friday, January 3, 2020
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Kansas Supreme Court
constitutional law—criminal procedure—motions—search and seizure
State v. Chavez-Majors
butler district court—affirmed on issue subject to review and remanded
court of appeals—affirmed in part
No. 115,286—december 20, 2019
FACTS: Chavez-Majors convicted of aggravated battery while driving under the influence, based on motorcycle accident that caused injury to another person. Park Ranger first at scene requested EMS to draw blood from unconscious Chavez-Majors. District court denied motion to suppress the blood test results, finding the warrantless search was reasonable under probable cause plus exigent circumstances exception which satisfied the three-prong test in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). Court of appeals affirmed the denial of motion to suppress, but reversed the conviction because Chavez-Majors had not knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to jury trial. 54 Kan. App. 2d 543 (2017). Review granted on Chavez-Majors petition for review of panel’s decision affirming the denial of motion to suppress. State’s cross-petition for review of the jury trial issue was denied.
ISSUES: (1) Warrantless search—probable cause; (2) warrantless search—exigent circumstances
HELD: Court of Appeals decision regarding probable cause is affirmed. Probable cause determination is supported by Chavez-Majors driving at high rate of speed around curve and into parking lot he knew held parked cars and congregating people, and by strong odor of alcohol on Chavez-Majors’s breath.
As to whether exigent circumstances supported the warrantless blood draw, lower courts did not have benefit of Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 588 U.S. __ (2019). Because Chavez-Majors has not had a chance to fully litigate his claim under the change of law created by Mitchell, case is remanded to district court for an evidentiary hearing and district court ruling on exigency in light of Mitchell.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 8-1567; K.S.A. 22-3216
Kansas Court of Appeals
ATTORNEY PERFORMANCE—HABEAS CORPUS
BAKER V. STATE
LABETTE DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 118,695—DECEMBER 20, 2019
FACTS: Baker pled guilty to felony murder, child abuse, possession of marijuana, and obstruction of official duty. Baker had originally been charged with aggravated criminal sodomy, a charge which could have resulted in a death penalty when combined with the murder charge, but it was dismissed under the plea agreement. At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel did not present any evidence regarding Baker's mental health. Baker received a hard 20 sentence for the felony murder, plus an additional 147 months for the other convictions. All of these sentences were presumptive for Baker's convictions, but Baker received the aggravated sentence rather than the standard sentence. Baker's convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. He timely filed a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, plus three amended motions, in which he claimed that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ensure that his grid sentences were ordered to run concurrently and for failing to investigate his mental health issues and present mitigating evidence. The district court denied the motion after an evidentiary hearing, and Baker appeals.
ISSUES: (1) Timeliness of the K.S.A. 60-1507 motion; (2) merits of Baker's motion
HELD: The State did not raise the timeliness issue before the district court. They waived any appellate argument by not arguing timeliness in district court. The panel assumes without deciding that trial counsel's performance was deficient under the totality of the circumstances. The only issue to decide is whether trial counsel's deficient performance was so prejudicial that Baker was harmed. The district court did not correctly apply the Strickland test and did not properly evaluate the evidence. But even when the correct test is used, the district court correctly determined that no prejudice resulted from trial counsel's deficient performance.
DISSENT: (Leben, J.) Trial counsel made no argument for anything less than the maximum possible sentence. There was a great deal of evidence regarding Baker's life experiences and mental health conditions, and that could have made a difference at sentencing. Trial counsel was prejudicially ineffective for not presenting that evidence at sentencing. He would remand this case for resentencing before a different judge.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-1507(f)(1); K.S.A. 60-1507
state v. gibson
geary district court—sentence vacated and case remanded
No. 120,657—december 20, 2019
FACTS: When Gibson was arrested on drug charges, he misidentified himself as his brother. The brother was then arrested for failure to show up for a hearing. Relevant to this appeal, Gibson was convicted of identity theft and perjury. Presumptive sentence was probation, but district court granted State’s motion for a dispositional-departure sentence of prison, finding the harm from Gibson’s crimes was greater than usual. Gibson appealed.
ISSUE: (1) Dispositional departure sentence
HELD: Statutory-counterpart rule discussed. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6815 provides lists of mitigating and aggravating circumstances the sentencing court may consider in deciding whether to depart. Although each list is nonexclusive, if something is listed as a factor on one of the two lists, the absence of that factor on the counterpart list means that it may not be the basis for departure in that departure direction. Because less-than-typical harm is in list of mitigating factors but greater-than-typical harm is not included in list of aggravating factors, greater-than-typical harm may not be the basis for an upward-departure sentence. Sentence vacated and case remanded for resentencing.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6815, -6815(c)(1)(E); K.S.A. 2005 Supp. 21-4716(c)(2)(D); K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 21-4716(c)(1)(B); K.S.A. 1997 Supp. 21-4716(b)(1)(E); K.S.A. 1994 Supp. 21-4716(b)(2)(A)
constitutional law—due process—criminal procedure—probation—statutes
state v. gonzalez
sedgwick district court—remanded with directions
No. 120,179—december 27, 2019
FACTS: Following a hearing and determination of competency, Gonzalez convicted and sentenced to 52 month prison term with dispositional departure to probation for 36 months. Some seven months later he was arrested for violating probation. Noting the statutory processes for competency evaluations do not explicitly apply to probation revocation proceedings, district court revoked probation without addressing competency concerns raised by appointed counsel. Gonzalez appealed, claiming a constitutionally protected right to be mentally competent at his probation hearing.
ISSUE: (1) Probation revocation—constitutional due process
HELD: Gonzalez’ Fourteenth Amendment claim was not waived by counsel’s assertion of rights notwithstanding her failure to mention “constitution” or “due process.” Competency for due process purposes in revoking probation, an issue not yet addressed by U.S. Supreme Court or Kansas Supreme Court, is examined. The State may not revoke probation of a convicted felon who is not mentally competent at the time of the revocation hearing. In this case, district court acknowledged there were legitimate reasons to believe Gonzalez may not have been competent. The absence of a statutory procedure for competency evaluations in criminal cases after defendants have been sentenced is not a barrier to district court’s inherent authority to order a competency evaluation as a means of extending constitutional due process to a probationer facing revocation. District court erred in revoking Gonzalez’ probation without determining he was mentally competent. On remand, district court should determine if a retrospective competency evaluation can be done. If State agrees to forgo that accommodation, or district court determines such an evaluation is not feasible, then the revocation must be set aside with a new revocation proceeding and competency evaluations ordered if genuine competency issues remain. Due process requirements for statutory sanctions short of revocation are distinguished and not addressed.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3303, -3716(b)(2), -3716(c)(1)(B), - 3716(c)(11), K.S.A. 22-3202, -3301 et seq., -3302(1)
state v. tearney
wyandotte district court—affirmed
No. 120,340—december 20, 2019
FACTS: In 2014, district court imposed prison term but granted dispositional departure for 36 months’ probation. Probation revoked in 2016. In unpublished opinion, court of appeals reversed the revocation and remanded because district court erroneously believed Tearney had served two intermediate sanctions. While that appeal was pending, Legislature enacted the dispositional departure exception, K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(9)(B), on July 1, 2017. On remand, district court applied the new exception and again revoked probation. Tearney appealed, claiming the exception does not apply retroactively.
ISSUE: (1) Probation revocation—retroactive application of dispositional departure exception
HELD: K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(9)(B) permits a district court to revoke a defendant’s probation without having imposed a graduated sanction if probation was originally granted as the result of a dispositional departure. This exception applies to probation violations which occur after July 1, 2013, even when those violations occurred before the dispositional departure exception took effect. Retroactive application of the exception does not result in manifest injustice. Accordingly, the exception applies to Tearney’s 2016 probation violations even though her violations occurred before the exception took effect.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 22-3716(c)(9)(A), -3716(c)(9)(B), -3716(c)(12); K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716(c)
Butler District Court
Geary District Court
Labette District Court
search and seizure
Sedgwick District Court
Posted By Administration,
Monday, July 8, 2019
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Kansas Court of Appeals
constitutional law—criminal law—fourth amendment—
state v. hinnenkamp
sedgwick district court—affirmed
No. 119,125—july 5, 2019
FACTS: District court ordered Hinnenkamp to submit to random drug and alcohol testing as a condition of probation for her aggravated escape from custody conviction. Hinnenkamp appealed, arguing K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6607(c)(6), which requires district courts to impose random drug and alcohol testing as a condition of probation, violates her federal and state constitutional right against unlawful search and seizure. State responds on merits of this argument, and also claims this issue is improperly raised for first time on appeal, jurisdiction is lacking because the issue is not ripe for consideration, and Hinnenkamp waived the issue by inadequate briefing.
ISSUES: (1) Threshold issues—preservation, ripeness, waiver; (2) constitutionality of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6607(c)(6)
HELD: Hinnenkamp is asserting her constitutional claim for first time on appeal, but her facial challenge to the constitutionality of the statute is considered. Her facial challenge to the statute is ripe for appeal, and she has not waived or abandoned her constitutional claim based on inadequate briefing.
K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6607(c)(6), which subjects probationers to suspicionless drug and alcohol testing, does not, on its face, violate the Fourth Amendment of U.S. Constitution or §15 of Kansas Bill of Rights. This mandatory statutory condition of probation is exempt from Fourth Amendment’s general warrant requirement because (1) special needs of the probation system make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable, and (2) the primary purpose of random drug and alcohol testing for probationers is distinguishable from State’s general interest in crime control. Weighing a probationer’s diminished expectation of privacy against State’s interest in promoting rehabilitation and probation compliance, and considering the efficacy of random suspicionless drug and alcohol testing, it is reasonable to permit a court services officer or community correctional services officer to order a probationer to submit to random drug and alcohol testing, even without any suspicion of wrongdoing. Two recent unpublished Court of Appeals opinions upholding the constitutionality of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6607(c)(6) in similar cases are cited and reviewed.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6607(c)(5), -6607(c)(6), 22-3717(k)(2); K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 8-1025
Posted By Administration,
Monday, September 10, 2018
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Kansas Supreme Court
ORDER OF REINSTATEMENT
IN THE MATTER OF LYLE LOUIS ODO
NO. 114,863 – SEPTEMBER 5, 2018
FACTS: Odo's license to practice law in Kansas was suspended for one year in July 2016. In July 2017, Odo filed a petition for reinstatement. After a hearing, the Kansas Board for Discipline of Attorneys recommended that the petition for reinstatement be granted. After careful consideration, the court accepted the panel's findings and grants the petition for reinstatement.
CENTRAL KANSAS MEDICAL CENTER V. HATESOHL
BARTON DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
COURT OF APPEALS—REVERSED
NO. 113,675—SEPTEMBER 7, 2018
FACTS: Central Kansas Medical Center is a nonprofit corporation which is licensed to operate an ambulatory surgical center. CKMC contracted with Dr. Hatesohl to provide family medicine services. The contract contained a postemployment clause which prevented Dr. Hatesohl from practicing medicine within a 50-mile radius of CKMC. Although he was dissatisfied with the way that the family practice merged with an urgent care facility, Dr. Hatesohl worked the full term of his contract. When he left, CKMC let him know that it would enforce all post-employment covenants. Dr. Hatesohl responded that he believed his employment contract was void because it violated the prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine doctrine. The day after his contract expired, Dr. Hatesohl entered a new contract with Great Bend Regional Hospital to practice family medicine. CKMC sought injunctive relief and damages alleging breach of contract. Dr. Hatesohl countered with a claim that CKMC's ambulatory surgical center license did not cover family medicine. The district court agreed and granted Dr. Hatesohl's motion for summary judgment, finding his employment contract was illegal. The court of appeals reversed and the petition for review was granted.
ISSUE: (1) Validity of employment contract
HELD: The practice of medicine is limited to licensed persons, not corporations. But a corporation which is licensed by the State may employ a physician to provide medical services, with the caveat that the physician may not practice medicine that the corporation is not licensed to provide. Since CKMC only held an ambulatory surgical center license, its power to provide family medicine services through Dr. Hatesohl had to flow from that license. It did not. An ambulatory surgical center license is not broad enough to encompass a family practice. Because Dr. Hatesohl was hired to practice medicine that CKMC was not licensed to perform, his employment contract violated the corporate practice of medicine doctrine and was void.
CONCURRENCE (Stegall, J.): The corporate practice of medicine doctrine should be abandoned because it is a judicial intrusion in to the legislative arena and was created to aid special interest groups. The decision of the majority is correct because the court was not asked to overturn the doctrine and stare decisis compels this decision.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2017 Supp. 17-2707(b)(9), 40-3401(f), 60-256(c)(2), 65-2803(a); K.S.A. 17-2709(a), 48-1603(o), -1607(a), 65-425(a), -425(b), -425(e), -425(f), -425(h), -427, -431(a), -431(c)
MCCULLOUGH V. WILSON
WYANDOTTE DISTRICT COURT — AFFIRMED
COURT OF APPEALS — AFFIRMED
NO. 115,067—SEPTEMBER 7, 2018
FACTS: Wilson was driving excessively fast when he collided with the back of car carrying McCullough and his passenger, Risley. McCullough and Risley filed a lawsuit against Wilson, seeking monetary damages for lost wages, pain and suffering, and medical expenses. Risley's medical expenses were paid by the PIP coverage provided by his AAA insurance. But AAA never requested reimbursement from Wilson's insurance company. After a jury decided in Risley's favor, Wilson sought to overturn part of the verdict on grounds that Risley's cause of action passed to AAA and that only AAA could recover damages for Risley's medical expenses. The district court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Wilson's petition for review was granted.
ISSUES: (1) Assignment of subrogation rights
HELD: The doctrine of stare decisis suggests that the district court's decision should be affirmed. Especially in cases involving contracts, reliance on prior precedent is important. Because there is no reason to depart from prior holdings, Risley is entitled to the entire verdict awarded by the jury, including the portion covering medical expenses.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 40-3103, -3113a, -3113a(c)
State v. Clapp
reno district court—reversed and remanded
court of appeals—reversed
No. 112,842—September 7, 2018
FACTS: Clapp was sentenced to a 118-month prison term and granted a downward dispositional departure to 36 months probation with a 60-day jail sanction to be suspended when inpatient drug treatment had been arranged. State filed its first motion to revoke in January 2014. District court revoked probation and imposed a180-day prison sanction. State filed a second motion to revoke in August 2014. District court revoked probation and imposed the underlying sentence, specifically stating he did not feel Clapp valued Community Corrections as a way to help change how Clapp thought and lived his life. District court agreed that Clapp had not committed a new crime, had not absconded, had a job, and was still in treatment, but commented on the convictions leading to Clapp’s probation, his criminal history, and his dishonesty with his intensive supervision officer. Clapp appealed, claiming in part the district court failed to make the statutory findings required by K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716(c)(9) to bypass the statutory intermediate sanctions for parole violators. Court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, finding in part that K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716 does not require district court to make statutory findings to bypass intermediate sanctions when a violator has already served a 180-day intermediate sanction, and that, even if required in this case, the district court implicitly satisfied the particularity requirement to revoke based upon public safety. Clapp’s petition for review was granted.
ISSUE: Probation violation sanctions under 2013 and 2014 Versions of K.S.A. 22-3716
HELD: District court’s revocation of Clapp’s probation under subsection (c)(1)(E) for a second probation violation did not conform to the graduated sanctioning scheme in the 2013 and 2014 versions of K.S.A. 22-3716. For a second violation, the district court could have utilized the prison sanction of 120- or 180-days under subsections (c)(1)(C)-(D). Imposition of the underlying sentence on a probation violator was not authorized under subsection (c)(1)(E) because no previous jail sanction pursuant to K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716(b)(4)(A)-(B) or K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716(c)(1)(B) had been imposed, notwithstanding the 60-day jail term in the original sentence or the district court’s error in imposing a 180-day sanction for Clapp’s first violation. Nor did the district court set forth the particularized reasons required by K.S.A. Supp. 22-3716(c)(9) to bypass the graduated intermediate sanctions. Instead, district court’s remarks were akin to historical reasoning for revoking probation prior to the 2013 amendment to K.S.A. 22-3716. Reversed and remanded for a new dispositional hearing to comply with K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2014 Supp. 22-3716, -3716(b), -3716(b)(4)(A)-(B), -3716(c)(1)(A)-(E), -3716(c)(8), -3716(c)(9), -3716(c)(12); K.S.A. 2013 Supp. 22-3716(c)(1)(D)-(E), -3716(c)(8), -3716(c)(9); and K.S.A. 22-3504(1)