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January 10, 2020 Digests

Posted By Administration, Monday, January 13, 2020
Updated: Monday, January 13, 2020

Kansas Supreme Court

criminal 

appeals—constitutional law—criminal law—evidence—statutes
state v. jenkins
shawnee district court—affirmed
no. 118,120—january 10, 2020

FACTS: Jenkins led police on two car chases that resulted in a fatal crash. Jury convicted him of crimes including first-degree felony murder and fleeing and eluding police. Over Jenkins’ objection, district judge allowed State to introduce recordings of five calls Jenkins made while in jail using his personal identification number (PIN), finding the State sufficiently established Jenkins’ identity as one of the speakers. On appeal, Jenkins claimed the district court erred by admitting the recordings of the jail calls, arguing reliance on his PIN was insufficient to establish he was the male speaker. He also challenged the constitutionality of K.S.A. 8-1568(b)(1)(E), the option within a means of the felony fleeing and eluding statute dependent on five or more moving violations.

ISSUES: (1) Admission of jail calls; (2) constitutionality of K.S.A. 8-1568(b)(1)(E)

HELD:  Court examined cases from other jurisdictions and concluded the seven-factor test for authenticating an audio recording outlined in State v. Williams, 235 Kan. 485 (1984), is no longer controlling in Kansas. Audio recordings qualify as writings under the Kansas Rules of Evidence. On record in this case, and under current Rules and cases interpreting them, district judge did not abuse his discretion by admitting the recorded calls as evidence. State proffered evidence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that Jenkins made the recorded calls: strong circumstantial evidence that Jenkins was the caller by use of his unique PIN, supported by the content and timing of the calls.

Claim that the term “moving violations” in Kansas felony fleeing and eluding statute is unconstitutionally vague, which Jenkins raised first time on appeal, is considered, finding the statute is not unconstitutionally vague. Jenkins’ reliance on State v. Richardson, 290 Kan. 176 (2010), is criticized. Conduct underlying each of the moving violations used to convict Jenkins of fleeing and eluding and felony murder is clearly prohibited by Kansas law, and plain language of the defining statutory and regulatory provisions is clear. Jenkins’ argument for application of the rule of lenity is rejected.

STATUTES: K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 8-234b(d), -249(b), -1568(b)(1)(B), -1568(b)(1)(C), -1568(b)(1)(D), –1568(b)(1)(E), -1568(b)(2), 66-1,108(f); K.S.A. 8-262, -1508(c), -1519,  -1522(a), -1528(b), -1545, -1548,  60-401 et seq., 401(m), -404, -464, 66-1,108a

appeals—constitutional law—criminal procedure—jury instructions—statutes
state v. patterson
johnson district court—affirmed
no.118,180—january 10, 2020

FACTS: Patterson was convicted of crimes arising from an armed robbery in which a victim was killed by an accomplice. On appeal he claimed: (1) his felony-murder conviction violated due process because a jury was not required to determine he possessed a particular criminal mental state; (2) district court’s instructions and prosecutor’s voir dire comments improperly prevented jury from exercising its nullification power; (3) his hard 25 life sentence for felony murder is disproportionate to his crime in violation of Kansas and United States constitutions; and (4) use of prior convictions to elevate his sentence violated Sixth Amendment rights under Apprendi.

ISSUES: (1) Felony-murder conviction; (2) instructing jury to apply the law; (3) prosecutor’s voir dire; (4) hard 25 life sentence; (5) Apprendi challenge

HELD: Constitutional challenge to felony-murder statute, raised by Patterson for first time on appeal, is considered. Felony-murder statute, K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5402(a)(2), does not operate as an unconstitutional conclusive presumption that invades the jury’s province. Intent to kill is not an element of felony murder. The statute expressly requires proof the defendant engaged in dangerous, felonious conduct and that a death occurred as a result of that conduct. By codifying participation in the felony as a statutory alternative for the intent and premeditation otherwise required for a first-degree murder conviction, the statute imposes a rule of law. It does not remove from jury’s consideration an intent element required by a criminal statute.

No merit to Patterson’s claim that district court’s instruction undermined the jury’s nullification power. District court’s instruction that jury had a “duty” to follow the law as set out in the instructions and that it “should find the defendant guilty” if State proved all elements of the charged offenses, was legally correct.

No merit to Patterson’s claim of error in prosecutor’s voir dire comment. It is not a misstatement of law to tell the jury to follow the law as given in the instructions.

Patterson did not show why his case is an exception to the general rule that case-specific challenges to § 9 of Kansas Constitution may not be raised for first time appeal. And his claim that a hard 25 life sentence is unconstitutional for a class of offenders (19-year olds) given the nature of his offense (those convicted of felony murder for a killing committed by another), fails to frame a valid categorical challenge to Eighth Amendment. The hard 25 life sentence is not categorically disproportionate as applied to young adults convicted of felony murder. Patterson’s reliance on Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010), is misplaced.

Patterson’s Apprendi claim has been repeatedly rejected and is summarily dismissed.

STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5202, -5202(a), -5202(d), -5402, -5402(a), -5402(a)(1), -5402(a)(2), -5402(b), 22- 3601(b)(3), -3601(b)(4) K.S.A. 21-3201 (Ensley)

criminal procedure—evidence—judges—statutes—witnesses
state v. lyman
geary district court—affirmed
no. 114,312 —january 10, 2020

FACTS: Lyman was convicted of felony murder based on abuse of a child, abuse of a child by shaking, and aggravated battery. After Lyman filed his appeal, defense counsel was served with disclosure of potentially exculpatory evidence that prosecutor recalled seeing a family resembling Lyman and victim with his family in a store, and that the woman had acted aggressively toward one of the children. Lyman filed motion for new trial on this newly discovered evidence. He also requested a change of judge for post trial matters, alleging the judge had been sleeping during trial. District court held hearing and concluded the prosecutor’s recollection was not corroborated and too speculative to warrant a new trial. On appeal Lyman claimed district court erred by: (1) denying the motion for new trial; (2) excluding Lyman’s proposed expert witness (Young) for failing to satisfy test under Daubert, (3) allowing State to admit photos as evidence of Lyman’s prior bad acts; (4) sleeping during the trial; and (5) prohibiting Lyman from introducing medical records that were subject to a written stipulation. He also claimed cumulative error denied him a fair trial.

ISSUES: (1) Motion for new trial; (2) expert witness; (3) evidence of prior bad acts; (4) judicial misconduct; (5) stipulated medical records; (6) cumulative error

HELD: District court did not abuse its discretion by finding the newly discovered evidence was not of such materiality that it would likely produce a different result upon retrial. Lyman’s further argument for a Brady violation fails because the evidence was not credibly exculpatory or impeaching.

Extended discussion of “Young’s postulate,” an inferential test Young had developed and used to base all his testimony and opinions in this case. District court did not abuse its discretion by excluding Young’s testimony for failure to satisfy test in Daubert, finding Young’s inferential test was contrary to fundamental tenets of Kansas evidence law, Young’s opinions were developed for purposes of testifying for defendants charged with child abuse, and that another Kansas trial court had found Young was not credible and his medical testimony was not worthy of any belief. Court rejects Lyman’s invitation to separate Young’s opinions reached from using the inferential test from those that were not.

Under facts in case, evidence documenting prior assault of a child sufficient to visibly distress him and leave bruises constitutes other crime evidence under K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60-455. For evidence so similar to medical observations and conclusions at issue it is reasonable to conclude the same individual committed both the prior acts and those claimed in this case. It is relevant to show the defendant's modus operandi, a disputed material fact, and is probative because it contradicts the defendant's claim that previous health issues and not the defendant caused the child's death. District court did not abuse its discretion in finding the probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.

Lyman’s motion for change of judge did not satisfy affidavit requirement in K.S.A. 20-4111d, and motion also fails on the merits.

Parties stipulated to the admissibility of medical records that form the basis of opinion of people for purposes of their direct and cross-examination. District court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to admit the medical records because the expert witness would not be testifying.

No errors support Lyman’s cumulative error claim.

STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 22-3501(1), 60-455, -455(a), -455(b), -456(b); K.S.A. 20-311d, -311d(b), 22-3501, 60-401(b), -455, -456(b)

Kansas Court of Appeals

CIVIL

EMPLOYMENT—LEGISLATORS—VICARIOUS LIABILITY
LONG V. HOUSER
CHEROKEE DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 120,866—JANUARY 10, 2020

FACTS: In 2017, Houser was a state representative for the State of Kansas. His job duties required that he be in Topeka during the legislative session. The state provided Houser with a per diem for lodging and meals, plus travel expenses. After the Legislature recessed for a break, Houser spent the night in Topeka and then got in his personal vehicle to return home. During the trip, Houser crossed the center line and hit Long's car, injuring him. Long sued both Houser and the State. The State sought summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable for Long's injuries because Houser was not acting within the scope of his employment while he was traveling home from Topeka. The district court agreed, and Long appealed.

ISSUE: (1) Whether Houser was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident

HELD: Vicarious liability is the idea that the losses caused by an employee's tortious conduct are passed on to the employer as a cost of doing business. Vicarious liability only exists if the employee was acting within the scope of their employment at the time the tortious activity occurred. Although it has not been used in a tort context, the "going and coming rule" applies to third-party tort liability claims as a gauge to determine whether vicarious liability exists. The facts of the case make it clear that Houser was not acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident. This is true even though the State reimbursed Houser for travel costs.

STATUTE: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 75-3203(a), -3202(b), -3203(e), -6103(a)

criminal 

appeals—constitutional law—criminal law—evidence—fourth amendment—motions 
state v. daino
johnson district court—reversed and remanded
no. 120,824—january 10, 2020

FACTS: Uniformed officers responded to report of marijuana odor coming from unit in apartment complex. Daino opened door 8-10 inches and officer asked if it was OK to step in to write ticket for marijuana. Daino did not verbally respond, but opened the door further and stood out of the way. Once officers discovered evidence of significant drug activity, Daino signed consent form for search of apartment but for roommate’s room. Drug charges filed. Daino filed motion to suppress, alleging illegal search in violation of Fourth Amendment. District court granted the motion, finding any reasonable person would have construed Daino’s response to indicate consent for officers to enter the apartment, but under Kansas law implied consent was not valid. State filed interlocutory appeal. On appeal Daino challenged sufficiency of the evidence of district court’s credibility finding regarding officer’s testimony.

ISSUES: (1) Cross-appeal; (2) consent to search

HELD: Sole issue on appeal is whether Daino’s consent for officers to enter apartment and investigate was invalid because it was implied. Daino filed no cross-appeal from district court’s adverse ruling, thus cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence or the district court’s credibility finding.

District court’s factual findings are supported by substantial competent evidence, but its legal conclusion that Kansas law requires express, verbal consent is erroneous. While it is well established law that mere acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is inadequate to show voluntary consent, no Kansas Supreme Court case holds that consent must be verbal to be valid. Application of “mere acquiescence” rule by Court of Appeals panels, and subsequent Kansas Supreme Court cases, are examined and factually distinguished. Federal court cases upholding implied consent to enter a residence also are cited. Here, uncontested facts show that Daino yielded right of way to officers by his nonverbal, affirmative communication. Totality of circumstances shows that he unequivocally, specifically, freely, and intelligently consented to officers entering his residence to investigate smell of marijuana.

DISSENT (Buser, J.): Under totality of circumstances, would find Daino did not unequivocally, specifically, and freely and intelligently consent to officer’s entry into the apartment. Officer’s statements to Daino were misleading, and insufficiently informed Daino of officer’s purpose in seeking entry into the apartment or of Daino’s constitutional right to refuse entry. A reasonable person would understand that Daino was silently acquiescing to officer’s claim of lawful authority to enter the apartment because officer knew there was marijuana inside and was required to issue a citation. Would affirm district court’s suppression of evidence due to Fourth Amendment violation.  

STATUTE: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 60- 2103(h); K.S.A. 21-5709(b)(1), 65-4105(d)(17), -4107(d)(1)

appeals—contempt—criminal procedure—evidence—witnesses
state v. lamb (towner)
shawnee district court—affirmed
No. 117,861—january 10, 2020

FACTS: Lamb charged with murder of victim in car Towner was driving, and with attempted murder of Towner. For Lamb’s preliminary hearing, Lamb and Towner had been transported to courthouse together and placed in same holding cell. When called to testify and identify Lamb as the shooter, Towner refused to testify. District court held Towner in contempt and ordered confinement. Charges against Lamb were dismissed. Towner appealed the court’s order of  direct criminal contempt, arguing he was threatened into not testifying and district court erred by not holding an in camera hearing, without Lamb present, so Towner could explain why he was not testifying. State asserted the appeal was moot because Towner had completed his six-month sentence for contempt, and failed to preserve his issue for appeal.

ISSUES: (1) Mootness of the appeal; (2) preservation of issue on appeal; (3) contempt

HELD: State v. Flanagan, 19 Kan. App. 2d 528 (1994), is distinguished as a contempt citation is not a criminal conviction and does not appear on a defendant’s criminal history. But mootness doctrine does not prevent the appeal because issue may be subject to repetition.

Panel proceeds on the merits notwithstanding close call whether Towner properly preserved his claim that there was insufficient evidence to find him in contempt because judge disregarded information from prosecutor that Towner was under duress and did not provide Towner a safe environment to set forth his defense.

District court’s decision finding Towner in direct criminal contempt is affirmed. A judge has no duty to sua sponte hold an in camera hearing to determine if a witness is fearful to testify when the witness makes no such request. Towner failed to make a proffer of the evidence he wanted the court to consider, and the three federal cases he cited do not support his position. A judge has no independent responsibility to seek out evidence of duress from a recalcitrant witness.

STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5107(a), -5206; K.S.A. 60-405

appeals—criminal procedure—jurisdiction—motions—sentences—statutes
state v. mccroy
reno district court—appeal dismissed
No. 120,783—january 10, 2020

FACTS: District court sanctioned McCroy with second 180-day prison term after he violated terms of probation. State did not file motion to correct the order and instead appealed, arguing the second sanction was an illegal sentence because Kansas law only contemplates one 180-day sanction. McCroy contends there is no jurisdiction to consider State’s appeal which was not authorized by K.S.A. 22-3602 or any other appellate jurisdiction statute.

ISSUE: Appellate jurisdiction

HELD: K.S.A. 22-3504, governing post trial motions including motion to correct an illegal sentence, is not an appellate jurisdiction statute and does not vest an appellate court with jurisdiction to consider an appeal by the State solely on the claim that a sentence is illegal. Instead, an appellate court’s jurisdiction in a criminal case must arise from one of the limited procedural postures set forth in K.S.A. 22-3602. Different conclusion summarily reached in State v. Scherzer, 254 Kan. 926 (1994), but the sweeping jurisdictional statement in Scherzer no longer reflects the state of Kansas law. Appellate court’s jurisdiction is limited to those situations authorized by statute. State did not present its argument as a question reserved under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(3), and panel makes no finding as to whether State’s general concerns regarding a second 180-day sanction could be raised in that context.

STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6820, 22-3501(1), -3502, -3504(1), -3602(a), -3602(b), -3602(f), -3716; K.S.A. 22-3504, -3504(a), -3601, -3602, -3602(b), -3602(b)(3), -3603, 60-1507, -2101, -2101(a), -2101(b)

Tags:  Appeals  Cherokee District Court  Constitutional Law  Contempt  Criminal Law  Criminal Procedure  Employment  Evidence  Fourth Amendment  Geary District Court  Johnson District Court  Judges  Jury Instructions  Legislators  Motions  Shawnee District Court  Statutes  Vicarious Liability  Witnesses 

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