Kansas Court of Appeals
BURCH V. KECK
PAWNEE DISTRICT COURT—REVERSED AND REMANDED
NO. 119,813—MAY 24, 2019
FACTS: Burch is a resident of the Sexual Predator Treatment Program in Larned. He filed a §1983 action claiming that SPTP officials violated his constitutional rights by seizing his property without due process. The Kansas Department for Aging and Disability Services moved to dismiss, claiming that Burch failed to exhaust administrative remedies before filing suit. The district court agreed and the case was dismissed. Burch appealed.
ISSUE: (1) Duty to exhaust administrative remedies
HELD: Section 1983 does not contain a requirement that movants exhaust administrative remedies before bringing an action under the statute. K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 59-29a24 does require participants in SPTP to exhaust administrative remedies. The federal statute pre-empts the exhaustion requirement of K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 59-29a24. The case must be remanded for proceedings on Burch's original motion.
STATUTES: 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 1997 (1)(B), § 1997e; K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 59-29a01, -29a02, -29a24
NEGLIGENCE—STATUTE OF REPOSE
DETERS V. NEMAHA-MARSHALL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION
NEMAHA DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 119,200—MAY 24, 2019
FACTS: In 1994, the Deterses purchased from Nemaha-Marshall a GTS, a device which allowed them to safely connect a generator to household wiring. The GTS was installed by Nemaha-Marshall on the Deterses' electric pole. In 2000, the Deterses transferred all of their electricity—including the GTS—to a new house, shop, and implement shed on their property. Over the course of a year, the Deterses had to replace multiple appliances due to malfunctions. The Deterses claimed this was due to faulty wiring in the GTS. Alliance, their homeowners insurer, denied their claim, pointing to a lack of coverage for low voltage events. The Deterses sued both Nemaha-Marshall and Alliance for damages related to replacement appliances. Nemaha-Marshall moved for summary judgment on statute of repose grounds, since it had been at least 10 years since the GTS was connected to the Deterses' property. Alliance also moved for summary judgment, citing a lack of coverage in the Deterses' insurance policy. Both motions were granted and the Deterses appeal.
ISSUES: (1) Statute of repose; (2) insurance coverage; (3) bad faith investigation
HELD:The statute of repose clock begins running on the last act giving rise to the cause of action, not the last contact between the parties. Plaintiffs must bring their negligence action within 10 years of the original wrongful act. In this case, that act occurred in 2000 and the Deterses' claim is barred by the statute of repose. Much of the Deterses' argument is waived due to the failure to adequately brief the argument. To the extent that issues have been preserved, the district court correctly found that the homeowners' insurance policy provided no coverage for low voltage events. Alliance investigated this claim appropriately, especially since the Deterses proposed two different causes for the damage.
STATUTE: K.S.A. 60-513, -513(a)(4), -513(b)
state v. sheppard
wyandotte district court—affirmed
no. 119,454—may 24, 2019
FACTS: Sheppard was convicted in 2006 of second-degree murder and criminal possession of a firearm. Convictions were affirmed in 2009. Sheppard filed in 2017 a pro se motion to dismiss, reiterating the claim in his unsuccessful 2011 K.S.A. 60-1507 motion that he was arrested without probable cause because affidavit facts were false. District court denied Sheppard’s motion for leave to file the motion to dismiss out of time, finding no showing of excusable neglect. Sheppard appealed. He then filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that under the 2016 amendments to K.S.A. 21-6810, the district court improperly included a decayed 1994 Missouri juvenile adjudication in calculating criminal history. District court denied the motion. Sheppard appealed. Appeals consolidated.
ISSUES: (1) Excusable neglect; (2) motion to correct illegal sentence—decayed juvenile adjudications
HELD: A showing of excusable neglect under different statutes, cases and administrative regulations is discussed. Under facts in this case and circumstances surrounding the untimely filing, the appellate court found no abuse of the district court’s discretion in finding Sheppard failed to establish excusable neglect.
The 2016 amendments to K.S.A. 21-6810 do not apply to Sheppard’s case. Court of appeals panels have consistently held the 2016 amendments to the juvenile decay rules are substantive in nature, and the legislature has included no clear language that intended the 2016 amendments to operate retroactively. District court correctly included Sheppard’s 1994 juvenile residential burglary adjudication in the criminal history score.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-5807, -6803, -6803(e), -6810(d), -6810(e), 22-3208(4), -3504, -3504(3), 60-206(b)(1)(B), 60-206(b)(1)(B); K.S.A. 21-3715, -4710, -6810, 60-206(b), -260(b)(1), -1507; K.S.A. 21-4710 (Furse 1995)
state v. Smith
shawnee district court—affirmed
no. 119,356—may 24, 2019
FACTS: Smith was convicted of possession of stolen property: a motorcycle that was damaged; and a scooter the Highway Patrol had towed, and then the towing company sold the scooter without first contacting the owner. Restitution order included $1365.77 for motorcycle repair, and $2141.93 replacement value for the scooter. Smith appealed, arguing insufficient evidence supported the amount of damage to the motorcycle. He also claimed that given the actions of law enforcement and the towing company there was no direct causal link between his crime and loss of the scooter, and argued the scooter owner should have been awarded fair market value rather than replacement cost.
ISSUES: (1) Restitution—sufficiency of the evidence; (2) restitution—causal link; (3) restitution—replacement value
HELD: District court found the motorcycle owner’s testimony about the condition of the motorcycle before and after it was stolen, and the need for the estimated repairs, was uncontroverted. Substantial competent evidence supported the district court’s findings.
As in State v. Arnett, 307 Kan. 648 (2018), but for Smith’s crime the scooter would not have been seized and towed. Applying Arnett, the district court’s factual determination of causation is accepted.
Under the restitution statute, K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5801(a)(4), the district court was legally permitted to order replacement costs as restitution, and Smith agreed that the scooter owner’s loss exceeded $2000.
STATUTES: K.S.A. 2018 Supp. 21-6604(b)(1); K.S.A. 2015 Supp. 21-5801, -5801(a)(4); K.S.A. 21-6604(b)(1)