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September 1, 2017 Digests

Posted By Administration, Tuesday, September 5, 2017
Updated: Tuesday, September 5, 2017

 

Kansas Supreme Court

 

Attorney Discipline

 

 

ORDER OF DISBARMENT
IN THE MATTER OF DAVID R. ALIG
NO. 17,358— AUGUST 25, 2017

FACTS: In a letter signed August 21, 2017, David R. Alig voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law in Kansas. At the time of surrender, a disciplinary complaint was pending against Alig.

HELD: The court accepted the surrender and Alig was disbarred.

 

ORDER OF DISBARMENT
IN THE MATTER OF BILL HAROLD RAYMOND
NO. 15,504—AUGUST 25, 2017

FACTS: In a letter signed August 21, 2017, Bill Harold Raymond, an attorney licensed to practice law in Kansas, voluntarily surrendered his license. At the time of surrender, a disciplinary complaint was pending which alleged violations of the KRPC.

HELD: The court found that the surrender of Raymond's license should be accepted and Raymond was disbarred.

 

Kansas Court of Appeals

 

Civil 

 

ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—HABEAS CORPUS
MCINTYRE V. STATE
DOUGLAS DISTRICT COURT—REVERSED AND REMANDED
NO. 111,580—SEPTEMBER 1, 2017

 

FACTS: McIntyre was convicted of several serious felonies. His convictions were confirmed upon direct appeal, and his first K.S.A. 60-1507 motion was denied by the district court; that denial was affirmed on appeal. More than 10 years later, McIntyre filed a second 1507 motion claiming that counsel for his first 1507 was ineffective. That motion was summarily denied by the district court—the grounds given for the denial were that McIntyre had no right to counsel because there was no rule requiring effective retained counsel in a collateral, civil attack. McIntyre appealed that ruling, and it was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on different grounds. But the Supreme Court granted review and sent the case back to the Court of Appeals so that McIntyre's substantive claims could be addressed.

ISSUE: Statutory right to effective assistance of counsel in 1507 appeals

HELD: The statutory right to counsel for 1507 movants is based on the apparent merits of the 1507 action rather than the financial means of the movant. A statutory right to counsel attaches once the district court determines that the motion presents substantial questions of law or triable issues of fact. Once that statutory right attaches, the movant is entitled to effective representation regardless of whether counsel is appointed or retained. In this case, the fact that the district court held a hearing on McIntyre's 1507 motion means there were substantial questions of law—which also means that he had the right to effective assistance of counsel. And once an appeal is filed, the statutory right to effective assistance attaches regardless of the relative merits of the motion and regardless of whether counsel was appointed or retained. 

STATUTE: K.S.A. 22-4501, -4506, -4506(b), -4506(c), 60-1507

 

 

Criminal

 

JURISDICTION—SENTENCING
STATE V. REEVES
RILEY DISTRICT COURT—AFFIRMED
NO. 117,120—SEPTEMBER 1, 2017

  

FACTS: After a conviction, the district court made border box findings and sentenced Reeves to 36 months' probation with an underlying presumptive sentence of 32 months' imprisonment. Reeves had a rocky start with probation and was before the court on multiple occasions for probation violation hearings. Reeves finally acknowledged that probation was not working for him, and he asked to be sent in to do his time. But he asked that his prison sentence be reduced from 32 months to 23 months. The district court denied the request to modify the sentence and Reeves appealed.

ISSUE: Whether the district court erred by refusing to modify the sentence 

HELD: The district court did have jurisdiction to modify Reeves' sentence had it chosen to do so. Reeves is not attempting to appeal his original sentence under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act. His appeal is limited to the sentence imposed at revocation and there is statutory authority for this appeal. But under the facts of the case, the district court did not err by refusing to modify Reeves' sentence.

STATUTE: K.S.A. 2016 Supp. 21-6815(a), -6820(c)(1), 22-3601(a), -3602(a), -3608(c), -3716(c)(1)(E)

 

 

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